Paper 2004/204

Authenticated tree parity machine key exchange

Markus Volkmer and Andre Schaumburg

Abstract

The synchronisation of Tree Parity Machines (TPMs), has proven to provide a valuable alternative concept for secure symmetric key exchange. Yet, from a cryptographer's point of view, authentication is at least as important as a secure exchange of keys. Adding an authentication via hashing e.g. is straightforward but with no relation to Neural Cryptography. We consequently formulate an authenticated key exchange within this concept. Another alternative, integrating a Zero-Knowledge protocol into the synchronisation, is also presented. A Man-In-The-Middle attack and even all currently known attacks, that are based on using identically structured TPMs and synchronisation as well, can so be averted. This in turn has practical consequences on using the trajectory in weight space. Both suggestions have the advantage of not affecting the previously observed physics of this interacting system at all.

Note: Revision after review.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.CR/0408044
Keywords
secret-key cryptographykey managementidentification protocolszero knowledge
Contact author(s)
markus volkmer @ tuhh de
History
2004-11-11: revised
2004-08-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/204
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/204,
      author = {Markus Volkmer and Andre Schaumburg},
      title = {Authenticated tree parity machine key exchange},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/204},
      year = {2004},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/204}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/204}
}
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