Paper 2004/194

A Note on An Encryption Scheme of Kurosawa and Desmedt

Rosario Gennaro and Victor Shoup

Abstract

Recently Kurosawa and Desmedt presented a new hybrid encryption scheme which is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. Their scheme is a modification of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. Its major advantage with respect to Cramer-Shoup is that it saves the computation of one exponentiation and produces shorter ciphertexts. However, the proof presented by Kurosawa and Desmedt relies on the use of information-theoretic key derivation and message authentication functions. In this note we present a different proof of security which shows that the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme can be instantiated with any computationally secure key derivation and message authentication functions, thus extending the applicability of their paradigm, and improving its efficiency.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
public-key encryptionchosen ciphertext security
Contact author(s)
shoup @ cs nyu edu
History
2005-05-18: revised
2004-08-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/194
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/194,
      author = {Rosario Gennaro and Victor Shoup},
      title = {A Note on An Encryption Scheme of Kurosawa and Desmedt},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/194},
      year = {2004},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/194}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/194}
}
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