Another Look at ``Provable Security''

Neal Koblitz; Alfred Menezes

Paper 2004/152

Another Look at ``Provable Security''

Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes

Abstract

We give an informal analysis and critique of several typical ``provable security'' results. In some cases there are intuitive but convincing arguments for rejecting the conclusions suggested by the formal terminology and ``proofs,'' whereas in other cases the formalism seems to be consistent with common sense. We discuss the reasons why the search for mathematically convincing theoretical evidence to support the security of public-key systems has been an important theme of researchers. But we argue that the theorem-proof paradigm of theoretical mathematics is of limited relevance here and often leads to papers that are confusing and misleading. Because our paper is aimed at the general mathematical public, it is self-contained and as jargon-free as possible.

Note: final version

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Also available at http://anotherlook.ca
Contact author(s): ajmeneze @ uwaterloo ca
History: 2011-08-15: last of 7 revisions; 2004-07-07: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2004/152
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/152,
      author = {Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes},
      title = {Another Look at ``Provable Security''},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/152},
      year = {2004},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/152}
}