Our results are based on a new adaptively-secure Feldman VSS scheme. Although adaptive security was already addressed by Feldman in the original paper, the scheme requires secure communication, secure erasure, and either a linear number of rounds or digital signatures to resolve disputes. Our scheme overcomes all of these shortcomings, but on the other hand requires some restriction on the corruption behavior of the adversary, which however disappears in some applications including our new DLKG protocol.
We also propose several new adaptively-secure protocols, which may find other applications, like a distributed trapdoor-key generation protocol for Pedersen's commitment scheme, an adaptively-secure Pedersen VSS scheme (as a {\em committed} VSS), or distributed-verifier proofs for proving relations among commitments or even any NP relations in general.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / threshold cryptography, universal composability Publication Info: This is the full version of a CRYPTO 04 paper. Date: received 25 May 2004, last revised 20 Jul 2004 Contact author: sfehr at ics mq edu au Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20040720:200458 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2004/119 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion