Paper 2004/105

Receipt-Free Homomorphic Elections and Write-in Ballots

Alessandro Acquisti

Abstract

We present a voting protocol that protects voters' privacy and achieves universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, and uncoercibility without ad hoc physical assumptions or procedural constraints (such as untappable channels, voting booths, smart cards, third-party randomizers, and so on). We discuss under which conditions the scheme allows voters to cast write-in ballots, and we show how it can be practically implemented through voter-verified (paper) ballots. The scheme allows voters to combine voting credentials with their chosen votes applying the homomorphic properties of certain probabilistic cryptosystems.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Electronic VotingReceipt-FreenessUncoercibilityWrite-In BallotsVoter-verified BallotsHomomorphic EncryptionPaillier cryptosystem.
Contact author(s)
acquisti @ andrew cmu edu
History
2004-05-07: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/105
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/105,
      author = {Alessandro Acquisti},
      title = {Receipt-Free Homomorphic Elections and Write-in Ballots},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/105},
      year = {2004},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/105}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/105}
}
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