Paper 2004/104
Efficient and Provably Secure Trapdoor-free Group Signature Schemes from Bilinear Pairings
Lan Nguyen and Rei Safavi-Naini
Abstract
Group signature schemes are cryptographic systems that provide revocable anonymity for signers. We propose a group signature scheme with constant-size public key and signature length that does not require trapdoor. So system parameters can be shared by multiple groups belonging to different organizations. The scheme is provably secure in the formal model recently proposed by Bellare, Shi and Zhang (BSZ04), using random oracle model, Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman and Strong Diffie-Hellman assumptions. We give a more efficient variant scheme and prove its security in a formal model which is a modification of BSZ04 model and has a weaker anonymity requirement. Both schemes are very efficient and the sizes of signatures are approximately one half and one third, respectively, of the sizes of the well-known ACJT00 scheme. We will show that the schemes can be used to construct a traceable signature scheme and identity escrow schemes. They can also be extended to provide membership revocation.
Note: This full version provides new signing and verifying algorithms that are secure against the attack in Eprint 2005/122 "Breaking and Repairing Trapdoor-free Group Signature Schemes from Asiacrypt 2004". The new algorithms are more efficient than the improvement proposed in Eprint 2005/122.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- PDF PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. An extended abstract appears in ASIACRYPT 2004
- Keywords
- Group signaturestraceable signaturesidentity escrowidentity escrowprivacy and anonymity.
- Contact author(s)
- ldn01 @ uow edu au
- History
- 2005-05-01: last of 3 revisions
- 2004-05-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/104
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/104, author = {Lan Nguyen and Rei Safavi-Naini}, title = {Efficient and Provably Secure Trapdoor-free Group Signature Schemes from Bilinear Pairings}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/104}, year = {2004}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/104} }