Paper 2003/261

A provably secure ID-based ring signature scheme

Javier Herranz and Germán Sáez

Abstract

Identity-based (ID) cryptosystems avoid the necessity of certificates to authenticate public keys in a digital communications system. This is desirable, specially for these applications which involve a large number of public keys in each execution. For example, any computation and verification of a ring signature scheme, where a user anonymously signs a message on behalf of a set of users including himself, requires to authenticate the public keys of all the members of the set. We use bilinear pairings to design a new ID-based ring signature scheme. We extend to the ID-based scehario some known results about the security of generic ring signature schemes. This allows us to formally prove the security of our scheme, under the assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard to solve.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Identity-based schemesring signaturesrandom oracle model
Contact author(s)
jherranz @ mat upc es
History
2003-12-20: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/261
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/261,
      author = {Javier Herranz and Germán Sáez},
      title = {A provably secure ID-based ring signature scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/261},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/261}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/261}
}
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