Paper 2003/237

Low-Cost Solutions for Preventing Simple Side-Channel Analysis: Side-Channel Atomicity

Benoit Chevallier-Mames, Mathieu Ciet, and Marc Joye

Abstract

This paper introduces simple methods to convert a cryptographic algorithm into an algorithm protected against simple side-channel attacks. Contrary to previously known solutions, the proposed techniques are not at the expense of the execution time. Moreover, they are generic and apply to virtually any algorithm. In particular, we present several novel exponentiation algorithms, namely a protected square-and-multiply algorithm, its right-to-left counterpart, and several protected sliding-window algorithms. We also illustrate our methodology applied to point multiplication on elliptic curves. All these algorithms share the common feature that the complexity is globally unchanged compared to the corresponding unprotected implementations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Cryptographic algorithmsside-channel analysisprotected implementationsatomicityexponentiationelliptic curves
Contact author(s)
marc joye @ gemplus com
History
2003-11-12: revised
2003-11-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/237
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/237,
      author = {Benoit Chevallier-Mames and Mathieu Ciet and Marc Joye},
      title = {Low-Cost Solutions for Preventing Simple Side-Channel Analysis: Side-Channel Atomicity},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/237},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/237}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/237}
}
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