Paper 2003/221
A Cryptanalysis of the Original Domingo-Ferrer's Algebraic Privacy Homomophism
Jung Hee Cheon and Hyun Soo Nam
Abstract
We propose a cryptanalysis of the original Domingo-Ferrer's algebraic privacy homomorphism. We show that the scheme over $\Z_n$ can be broken by $d+1$ known plaintexts in $O(d^3\log^2 n)$ time when it has $d$ times expansion through the encryption. Furthermore even when the public modulus $n$ is kept secret, it can be broken by $d+2$ known plaintexts in time at most $O(d^5\log^2(dn))$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Privacy homomorphismEncrypted DataDatabase Security
- Contact author(s)
- hsnam @ math snu ac kr
- History
- 2003-10-13: revised
- 2003-10-12: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/221
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/221,
author = {Jung Hee Cheon and Hyun Soo Nam},
title = {A Cryptanalysis of the Original Domingo-Ferrer's Algebraic Privacy Homomophism},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/221},
year = {2003},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/221}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/221}
}
