Paper 2003/162
Cryptanalysis of the Alleged SecurID Hash Function
Alex Biryukov, Joseph Lano, and Bart Preneel
Abstract
The SecurID hash function is used for authenticating users to a corporate computer infrastructure. We analyse an alleged implementation of this hash function. The block cipher at the heart of the function can be broken in few milliseconds on a PC with 70 adaptively chosen plaintexts. The 64-bit secret key of 10$\%$ of the cards can be discovered given two months of token outputs and $2^{48}$ analysis steps. A larger fraction of cards can be covered given more observation time.
Note: New attack on the full Alleged SecurID Hash Function.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Updated version of a paper, which will appear in SAC'03 preproceedings
- Keywords
- alleged SecurIDcryptanalysisinternal collisionvanishing differential
- Contact author(s)
- abiryuko @ esat kuleuven ac be
- History
- 2003-10-29: last of 3 revisions
- 2003-08-11: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/162
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/162,
author = {Alex Biryukov and Joseph Lano and Bart Preneel},
title = {Cryptanalysis of the Alleged {SecurID} Hash Function},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/162},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/162}
}
