Paper 2003/129

Attack on Han et al.'s ID-based Confirmer (Undeniable) Signature at ACM-EC'03

Fangguo Zhang, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Willy Susilo

Abstract

At the fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce (EC'03), S. Han, K.Y. Yeung and J. Wang proposed an ID-based confirmer signature scheme using pairings (actually, this is an ID-based undeniable signature scheme). However, in this paper, we will show that this signature scheme is not secure. The signer can deny any signature, even this signature is his valid signature and any one can forge a valid confirmer signature of a signer with identity ID on an arbitrary message and confirm this signature to the verifier.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Confirmer signatureUndeniable signatureAttackBilinear pairingsID-based cryptography.
Contact author(s)
fangguo @ uow edu au
History
2003-08-12: last of 2 revisions
2003-07-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/129
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/129,
      author = {Fangguo Zhang and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Willy Susilo},
      title = {Attack on Han et al.'s ID-based Confirmer (Undeniable) Signature at ACM-EC'03},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/129},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/129}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/129}
}
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