Paper 2003/115

Cryptanalysis of ID-based Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols

Kyungah Shim

Abstract

In this paper, we show that the Nalla-Reddy's one round ID-based tripartite authenticated key agreement protocols are still insecure against the man-in-the-middle attacks. We also break the Nalla's ID-based tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol with signatures.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
cryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
kashim @ kisa or kr
History
2003-08-06: revised
2003-06-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/115
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/115,
      author = {Kyungah Shim},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of ID-based Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/115},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/115}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/115}
}
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