Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2003/115

Cryptanalysis of ID-based Tripartite Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols

Kyungah Shim

Abstract: In this paper, we show that the Nalla-Reddy's one round ID-based tripartite authenticated key agreement protocols are still insecure against the man-in-the-middle attacks. We also break the Nalla's ID-based tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol with signatures.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / cryptanalysis

Date: received 3 Jun 2003, last revised 5 Aug 2003

Contact author: kashim at kisa or kr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20030806:044246 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2003/115

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