Paper 2003/067
Forking Lemmas in the Ring Signatures' Scenario
Javier Herranz and Germán Sáez
Abstract
Pointcheval and Stern introduced in 1996 some forking lemmas useful to prove the security of a family of digital signature schemes. This family includes, for example, Schnorr's scheme and a modification of ElGamal signature scheme. In this work we generalize these forking lemmas to the ring signatures' scenario. In a ring signature scheme, a signer in a subset (or {\it ring}) of potential signers produces a signature of a message in such a way that the receiver can verify that the signature comes from a member of the ring, but cannot know which member has actually signed. We propose a new ring signature scheme, based on Schnorr signature scheme, which provides unconditional anonymity. We use the generalized forking lemmas to prove that this scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks, in the random oracle model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- ring signature schemesrandom oracle model
- Contact author(s)
- jherranz @ mat upc es
- History
- 2003-04-11: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2003/067
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/067,
author = {Javier Herranz and Germán Sáez},
title = {Forking Lemmas in the Ring Signatures' Scenario},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/067},
year = {2003},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/067}
}
