Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2003/038

Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions

Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai

Abstract: In this paper, we propose a pretty-simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol, which is proven to be secure in the standard model under the following three assumptions. (1) DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard. (2) The entropy of the password is large enough to avoid on-line exhaustive search (but not necessarily off-line exhaustive search). (3) MAC is selectively unforgeable against partially chosen message attacks, (which is weaker than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks).

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / identification protocols

Publication Info: Published in IEICE Trans., vol. E85-A, no. 10, pp. 2229-2237, 2002.10

Date: received 24 Feb 2003

Contact author: kobara at iis u-tokyo ac jp

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Version: 20030227:220444 (All versions of this report)

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