Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2003/038
Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions
Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a pretty-simple
password-authenticated key-exchange protocol,
which is
proven to be secure in the standard model under the following
three assumptions. (1) DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman)
problem is hard. (2) The entropy of the password is large
enough to avoid
on-line exhaustive search (but not necessarily off-line
exhaustive search). (3) MAC is selectively unforgeable
against partially chosen message attacks, (which is weaker
than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks).
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / identification protocols
Publication Info: Published in IEICE Trans., vol. E85-A, no. 10, pp. 2229-2237, 2002.10
Date: received 24 Feb 2003
Contact author: kobara at iis u-tokyo ac jp
Available formats: Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20030227:220444 (All versions of this report)
Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion
[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]