Paper 2003/038

Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions

Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a pretty-simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol, which is proven to be secure in the standard model under the following three assumptions. (1) DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard. (2) The entropy of the password is large enough to avoid on-line exhaustive search (but not necessarily off-line exhaustive search). (3) MAC is selectively unforgeable against partially chosen message attacks, (which is weaker than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Published in IEICE Trans., vol. E85-A, no. 10, pp. 2229-2237, 2002.10
Keywords
identification protocols
Contact author(s)
kobara @ iis u-tokyo ac jp
History
2003-02-27: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/038
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/038,
      author = {Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai},
      title = {Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/038},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/038}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/038}
}
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