Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions

Kazukuni Kobara; Hideki Imai

Paper 2003/038

Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions

Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a pretty-simple password-authenticated key-exchange protocol, which is proven to be secure in the standard model under the following three assumptions. (1) DDH (Decision Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard. (2) The entropy of the password is large enough to avoid on-line exhaustive search (but not necessarily off-line exhaustive search). (3) MAC is selectively unforgeable against partially chosen message attacks, (which is weaker than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks).

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Published in IEICE Trans., vol. E85-A, no. 10, pp. 2229-2237, 2002.10
Keywords: identification protocols
Contact author(s): kobara @ iis u-tokyo ac jp
History: 2003-02-27: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2003/038
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/038,
      author = {Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai},
      title = {Pretty-Simple Password-Authenticated Key-Exchange Under Standard Assumptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2003/038},
      year = {2003},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/038}
}