Paper 2003/027

Cryptographic Randomized Response Techniques

Andris Ambainis, Markus Jakobsson, and Helger Lipmaa

Abstract

We develop cryptographically secure techniques to guarantee unconditional privacy for respondents to polls. Our constructions are efficient and practical, and are shown not to allow cheating respondents to affect the ``tally'' by more than their own vote --- which will be given the exact same weight as that of other respondents. We demonstrate solutions to this problem based on both traditional cryptographic techniques and quantum cryptography.

Note: Improved readability, plus applications in privacy-preserving data-mining.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
classical cryptographyoblivious transferpollingprivacyprivacy-preserving data-miningquantum cryptographyrandomized response technique
Contact author(s)
helger @ tcs hut fi
History
2003-05-22: revised
2003-02-11: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/027
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/027,
      author = {Andris Ambainis and Markus Jakobsson and Helger Lipmaa},
      title = {Cryptographic Randomized Response Techniques},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/027},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/027}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/027}
}
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