Paper 2002/192
Security Proofs for an Efficient Password-Based Key Exchange
Emmanuel Bresson, Olivier Chevassut, and David Pointcheval
Abstract
Password-based key exchange schemes are designed to provide entities communicating over a public network, and sharing a (short) password only, with a session key (e.g, the key is used for data integrity and/or confidentiality). The focus of the present paper is on the analysis of very efficient schemes that have been proposed to the IEEE P1363 Standard working group on password-based authenticated key-exchange methods, but for which actual security was an open problem. We analyze the AuthA key exchange scheme and give a complete proof of its security. Our analysis shows that the AuthA protocol and its multiple modes of operation are provably secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman intractability assumption, in both the random-oracle and the ideal-cipher models.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- key exchangedictionary attack
- Contact author(s)
- David Pointcheval @ ens fr
- History
- 2003-10-23: revised
- 2002-12-19: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2002/192
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/192,
author = {Emmanuel Bresson and Olivier Chevassut and David Pointcheval},
title = {Security Proofs for an Efficient Password-Based Key Exchange},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2002/192},
year = {2002},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/192}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/192}
}
