Key recovery attacks on NTRU without ciphertext validation routine

Daewan Han; Jin Hong; Jae Woo Han; Daesung Kwon

Paper 2002/188

Key recovery attacks on NTRU without ciphertext validation routine

Daewan Han, Jin Hong, Jae Woo Han, and Daesung Kwon

Abstract

NTRU is an efficient public-key cryptosystem proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman. Assuming access to a decryption oracle, we show ways to recover the private key of NTRU systems that do not include a ciphertext validating procedure. The strongest of our methods will employ just a single call to the oracle, and in all cases, the number of calls needed will be small enough to be realistic.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: cryptanalysis NTRU chosen-ciphertext attack
Contact author(s): jinhong @ bigfoot com
History: 2003-04-19: revised; 2002-12-12: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2002/188
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/188,
      author = {Daewan Han and Jin Hong and Jae Woo Han and Daesung Kwon},
      title = {Key recovery attacks on {NTRU} without ciphertext validation routine},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/188},
      year = {2002},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/188}
}