Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2002/184

Identity Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings

Liqun Chen and Caroline Kudla

Abstract: We investigate a number of issues related to identity based authenticated key agreement protocols using the Weil or Tate pairings. These issues include how to make protocols efficient; how to avoid key escrow by a Trust Authority (TA) who issues identity based private keys for users, and how to allow users to use different Trusted Authorities. We describe a few authenticated key agreement (AK) protocols and AK with key confirmation (AKC) protocols which are modified from Smart's AK protocol. We study the security of these protocols heuristically and using provable security methods. In addition, we prove that our AK protocol is immune to key compromise impersonation attacks, and we also show that our second protocol has the TA forward secrecy property (which we define to mean that the compromise of the TA's private key will not compromise previously established session keys). We also show that this TA forward secrecy property implies that the protocol has the perfect forward secrecy property.

Category / Keywords: Identity-based cryptography, authenticated key agreement protocols, provable security.

Publication Info: Earlier version published in Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 219-233, IEEE Computer Society Press, June 2003.

Date: received 28 Nov 2002, last revised 27 May 2004

Contact author: liqun chen at hp com

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This version corrects errors in the security proofs of earlier versions of the paper.

Version: 20040527:132248 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2002/184

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