Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2002/184
Identity Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings
Liqun Chen and Caroline Kudla
Abstract: We investigate a number of issues related to identity based
authenticated key agreement protocols using the Weil or Tate
pairings. These issues include how to make protocols efficient;
how to avoid key escrow by a Trust Authority (TA) who issues
identity based private keys for users, and how to allow users to
use different Trusted Authorities. We describe a few authenticated
key agreement (AK) protocols and AK with key confirmation (AKC)
protocols which are modified from Smart's AK protocol.
We study the security of these protocols heuristically and using
provable security methods. In addition, we prove that our AK
protocol is immune to key compromise impersonation attacks, and we
also show that our second protocol has the TA forward secrecy
property (which we define to mean that the compromise of the TA's
private key will not compromise previously established session
keys). We also show that this TA forward secrecy property implies
that the protocol has the perfect forward secrecy property.
Category / Keywords: Identity-based cryptography, authenticated key agreement protocols, provable security.
Publication Info: Earlier version published in Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 219-233, IEEE Computer Society Press, June 2003.
Date: received 28 Nov 2002, last revised 27 May 2004
Contact author: liqun chen at hp com
Available formats: Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: This version corrects errors in the security proofs of earlier versions of the paper.
Version: 20040527:132248 (All versions of this report)
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