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Paper 2002/180
OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC
Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa
Abstract
In this paper, we present One-key CBC MAC (OMAC) and prove its security for arbitrary length messages. OMAC takes only one key, $K$ ($k$ bits) of a block cipher $E$. Previously, XCBC requires three keys, $(k+2n)$ bits in total, and TMAC requires two keys, $(k+n)$ bits in total, where $n$ denotes the block length of $E$. The saving of the key length makes the security proof of OMAC substantially harder than those of XCBC and TMAC.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- PDF PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Pre-proceedings of FSE 2003
- Keywords
- CBC MACblock cipherprovable security
- Contact author(s)
- iwata @ cis ibaraki ac jp
- History
- 2003-03-10: revised
- 2002-12-01: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2002/180
- License
-
CC BY