Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel

D.  Page

Paper 2002/169

Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel

D. Page

Abstract

We expand on the idea, proposed by Kelsey et al, of cache memory being used as a side-channel which leaks information during the run of a cryptographic algorithm. By using this side-channel, an attacker may be able to reveal or narrow the possible values of secret information held on the target device. We describe an attack which encrypts chosen plaintexts on the target processor in order to collect cache profiles and then performs around computational steps to recover the key. As well as describing and simulating the theoretical attack, we discuss how hardware and algorithmic alterations can be used to defend against such techniques.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Publication info: Published elsewhere. University of Bristol Technical Report CSTR-02-003, Sumbitted to TISSEC
Keywords: DES cache memory side channel analysis smart cards cryptanalysis
Contact author(s): page @ cs bris ac uk
History: 2002-11-12: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2002/169
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/169,
      author = {D.  Page},
      title = {Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/169},
      year = {2002},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/169}
}