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Paper 2002/142

On the Applicability of Distinguishing Attacks Against Stream Ciphers

Greg Rose and Philip Hawkes

Abstract

We demonstrate that the existence of distinguishing attacks against stream ciphers is unrelated to their security in practical use, and in particular that the amount of data required to perform a distinguishing attack is unrelated to the key length of the cipher. The implication for the NESSIE Project is that no submitted symmetric cipher would be accepted under the unpublished rules for distinguishing attacks, not even the block ciphers in Counter Mode or Output Feedback Mode.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Submitted to third NESSIE workshop
Keywords
distinguishing attackstream cipher
Contact author(s)
ggr @ qualcomm com
History
2002-09-17: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2002/142
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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