Paper 2002/137

Provably Secure Steganography

Nicholas J. Hopper, John Langford, and Luis von Ahn

Abstract

Informally, steganography is the process of sending a secret message from Alice to Bob in such a way that an eavesdropper (who listens to all communications) cannot even tell that a secret message is being sent. In this work, we initiate the study of steganography from a complexity-theoretic point of view. We introduce definitions based on computational indistinguishability and we prove that the existence of one-way functions implies the existence of secure steganographic protocols. NOTE: An extended abstract of this paper appeared in CRYPTO 2002. Here we present a full version, including a correction to a small error in Construction 1.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Appeared in CRYPTO 2002.
Keywords
steganography
Contact author(s)
biglou @ cs cmu edu
History
2002-09-12: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2002/137
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/137,
      author = {Nicholas J.  Hopper and John Langford and Luis von Ahn},
      title = {Provably Secure Steganography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2002/137},
      year = {2002},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/137}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/137}
}
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