Encryption-Scheme Security in the Presence of Key-Dependent Messages

J.  Black; P.  Rogaway; T.  Shrimpton

Paper 2002/100

Encryption-Scheme Security in the Presence of Key-Dependent Messages

J. Black, P. Rogaway, and T. Shrimpton

Abstract

Encryption that is only semantically secure should not be used on messages that depend on the underlying secret key; all bets are off when, for example,one encrypts using a shared key K the value K. Here we introduce a new notion of security, KDM security, appropriate for key-dependent messages. The notion makes sense in both the public-key and shared-key settings. For the latter we show that KDM security is easily achievable within the random-oracle model. By developing and achieving stronger notions of encryption-scheme security it is hoped that protocols which are proven secure under ``formal'' models of security can, in time, be safely realized by generically instantiating their primitives.

Metadata

Available format(s): PS
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Published elsewhere. To appear at SAC'02
Keywords: Definitions ``formal'' cryptography semantic security symmetric encryption
Contact author(s): teshrim @ ucdavis edu
History: 2002-07-25: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2002/100
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/100,
      author = {J.  Black and P.  Rogaway and T.  Shrimpton},
      title = {Encryption-Scheme Security in the Presence of Key-Dependent Messages},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/100},
      year = {2002},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/100}
}