Attack on Private Signature Keys of the OpenPGP Format, PGP(TM) Programs and Other Applications Compatible with OpenPGP

Vlastimil Klima; Tomas Rosa

Paper 2002/076

Attack on Private Signature Keys of the OpenPGP Format, PGP(TM) Programs and Other Applications Compatible with OpenPGP

Vlastimil Klima and Tomas Rosa

Abstract

The article describes an attack on OpenPGP format, which leads to disclosure of the private signature keys of the DSA and RSA algorithms. The OpenPGP format is used in a number of applications including PGP, GNU Privacy Guard and other programs specified on the list of products compatible with OpenPGP, which is available at http://www.pgpi.org/products. Therefore all these applications must undergo the same revision as the actual program PGP. The success of the attack was practically verified and demonstrated on the PGP program, version 7.0.3 with a combination of AES and DH/DSS algorithms. As the private signature key is the basic information of the whole system which is kept secret, it is encrypted using the strong cipher. However, it shows that this protection is illusory, as the attacker has neither to attack this cipher nor user´s secret passphrase. A modification of the private key file in a certain manner and subsequent capturing of one signed message is sufficient for successful attack. Insufficient protection of the integrity of the public as well as private parts of signature keys in the OpenPGP format is analyzed in DSA and RSA algorithms and on the basis of this, a procedure of attacks is shown on both private signature keys. The attacks apply to all lengths of parameters (modules, keys) of RSA and DSA. In the end the cryptographic measures for correction of the OpenPGP format as well as PGP format are proposed.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Originally published on March 2001 at http://www.i.cz/en/pdf/openPGP_attack_ENGvktr.pdf
Keywords: PGP OpenPGP fault attack RSA DSA
Contact author(s): vlastimil klima @ i cz
History: 2002-06-17: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2002/076
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/076,
      author = {Vlastimil Klima and Tomas Rosa},
      title = {Attack on Private Signature Keys of the {OpenPGP} Format, {PGP}({TM}) Programs and Other Applications Compatible with {OpenPGP}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/076},
      year = {2002},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/076}
}