Randomized partial checking is exceptionally efficient compared to previous proposals for providing robustness; the evidence provided at each layer is shorter than the output of that layer, and producing the evidence is easier than doing the mixing. It works with mix nets based on any encryption scheme (i.e., on public-key alone, and on hybrid schemes using public-key/symmetric-key combinations). It also works both with Chaumian mix nets where the messages are successively encrypted with each servers' key, and with mix nets based on a single public key with randomized re-encryption at each layer.
Randomized partial checking is particularly well suited for voting systems, as it ensures voter privacy and provides assurance of correct operation. Voter privacy is ensured (either probabilistically or cryptographically) with appropriate design and parameter selection. Unlike previous work, our work provides voter privacy as a global property of the mix net rather than as a property ensured by a single honest server. RPC-based mix nets also provide very high assurance of a correct election result, since a corrupt server is very likely to be caught if it attempts to tamper with even a couple of ballots.
Category / Keywords: applications / mix network, mix net, shuffle network, electronic voting, randomized partial checking, public verifiability Date: received 26 Feb 2002 Contact author: mjakobsson at rsasecurity com Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20020226:175950 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2002/025 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion