Paper 2002/015

Security proofs of cryptographic protocols

Eva Jencusova

Abstract

In time of internet attacks is important to use cryptographic protcols and algorithms to secure private data that are sent via Internet. But using of such protocol is not enough. To really secure our data we must know that used protocol is secure. For this purpose where a lot of methods design such as well-known BAN logic. In this articel we want to present DLA (Database and Logic Abduction)- method that is used to prove that a security or cryptographic protocol is secure or it is possible perform an attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
securitycryptographic protocolsIPsecIKENeedham-Schroeder protocolproofs of cryptographic protocolsverifying of of cryptographic protocolsDatalogAbduction
Contact author(s)
jencusova @ yahoo com
History
2002-02-04: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2002/015
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/015,
      author = {Eva Jencusova},
      title = {Security proofs of cryptographic protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2002/015},
      year = {2002},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/015}
}
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