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Paper 2002/005

Cryptanalysis of Stream Cipher COS (2,128) Mode I

Hongjun Wu and Feng Bao

Abstract

Filiol and Fontaine recently proposed a family of stream ciphers named COS. COS is based on nonlinear feedback shift registers and was claimed to be with high cryptographic strength. Babbage showed that COS $(2,128)$ Mode II is extremely weak. But Babbage's attack is too expensive to break the COS $(2,128)$ Mode I (the complexity is around $2^{52}$). In this paper, we show that the COS $(2,128)$ Mode I is too weak. With about $2^{16}$-bit known plaintext, the secret information could be recovered with small amount of memory and computation time (less than one second on a Pentium IV Processor).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PS
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
stream cipherscryptanalysisCOS
Contact author(s)
hongjun @ krdl org sg
History
2002-01-04: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2002/005
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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