Paper 2001/095

Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust

Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi

Abstract

We argue that threshold trust is not an option in most of the real-life electronic auctions. We then propose two new cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that involve, apart from the bidders and the seller , an auction authority so that unless and collude the outcome of auctions will be correct, and moreover, will not get any information about the bids, while will learn bid statistics. Further extensions make it possible to decrease damage that colluding and can do, and to construct st price auction schemes. The communication complexity between the and in medium-size auctions is at least one order of magnitude less than in the Naor-Pinkas-Sumner scheme.

Note: Final version, the changes are minor and mainly cosmetical. More information on this paper is available at http://www.tcs.hut.fi/~helger/papers/lan02

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Published in Financial Cryptography 2002.
Keywords
cryptographic auction schemeshomomorphic encryptionrange proofsVickrey auctions
Contact author(s)
helger @ tcs hut fi
History
2002-05-03: last of 6 revisions
2001-11-13: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2001/095
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/095,
      author = {Helger Lipmaa and N.  Asokan and Valtteri Niemi},
      title = {Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/095},
      year = {2001},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/095}
}
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