Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2001/095
Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust
Helger Lipmaa and N. Asokan and Valtteri Niemi
Abstract: We argue that threshold trust is not an option in most of the real-life
electronic auctions. We then propose two new cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that involve, apart from the bidders and the seller $S$, an auction authority $A$ so that unless $S$ and $A$ collude the outcome of auctions will be correct, and moreover, $S$ will not get any information about the bids, while $A$ will learn bid statistics. Further extensions make it possible to decrease damage that colluding $S$ and $A$ can do, and to construct $(m+1)$st price auction schemes. The communication complexity between the $S$ and $A$ in medium-size auctions is at least one order of magnitude less than in the Naor-Pinkas-Sumner scheme.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / cryptographic auction schemes, homomorphic encryption, range proofs, Vickrey auctions
Publication Info: Published in Financial Cryptography 2002.
Date: received 13 Nov 2001, last revised 3 May 2002
Contact author: helger at tcs hut fi
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Final version, the changes are minor and mainly cosmetical. More information on this paper is available at http://www.tcs.hut.fi/~helger/papers/lan02
Version: 20020503:085437 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2001/095
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