Paper 2001/080

COS Ciphers are not "extremely weak"! - The Design Rationale of COS Ciphers

Eric Filiol and Caroline Fontaine

Abstract

This note summarizes the results of Babbage's cryptanalysis of COS ciphers and shows that in fact COS ciphers are not weak as claimed. These ciphers have been designed according a novel concept of encryption directly determined by the context of use. This concept is here more precisely defined.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PS
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
stream ciphercryptanalysisCOSNon Linear Feedback Shift Registerscopyright protection
Contact author(s)
Eric Filiol @ inria fr
History
2001-09-17: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2001/080
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/080,
      author = {Eric Filiol and Caroline Fontaine},
      title = {COS Ciphers are not "extremely weak"! - The Design Rationale of COS Ciphers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2001/080},
      year = {2001},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/080}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/080}
}
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