Paper 2001/078
The COS Stream Ciphers are Extremely Weak
Steve Babbage
Abstract
A new family of very fast stream ciphers called COS (for "crossing over system") has been proposed by Filiol and Fontaine, and seems to have been adopted for at least one commercial standard. In this note we show that the COS ciphers are very weak indeed — it requires negligible effort to reconstruct the state of the keystream generator from a very small amount of known keystream.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- PDF PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- COSstream ciphernonlinear feedback shift registercryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- steve babbage @ vodafone com
- History
- 2001-09-11: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2001/078
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/078, author = {Steve Babbage}, title = {The {COS} Stream Ciphers are Extremely Weak}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2001/078}, year = {2001}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/078} }