**Resettably-Sound Zero-Knowledge and its Applications**

*Boaz Barak and Oded Goldreich and Shafi Goldwasser and Yehuda Lindell*

**Abstract: **Resettably-sound proofs and arguments remain sound even when the
prover can reset the verifier, and so force it to use the same
random coins in repeated executions of the protocol. We show that
resettably-sound zero-knowledge {\em arguments} for NP exist
if collision-resistant hash functions exist. In contrast,
resettably-sound zero-knowledge {\em proofs} are possible only
for languages in P/poly.

We present two applications of resettably-sound zero-knowledge arguments. First, we construct resettable zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge for NP, using a natural relaxation of the definition of arguments (and proofs) of knowledge. We note that, under the standard definition of proofs of knowledge, it is impossible to obtain resettable zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge for languages outside BPP. Second, we construct a constant-round resettable zero-knowledge argument for NP in the public-key model, under the assumption that collision-resistant hash functions exist. This improves upon the sub-exponential hardness assumption required by previous constructions.

We emphasize that our results use non-black-box zero-knowledge simulations. Indeed, we show that some of the results are {\em impossible} to achieve using black-box simulations. In particular, only languages in BPP have resettably-sound arguments that are zero-knowledge with respect to black-box simulation.

**Category / Keywords: **foundations / zero-knowledge, resettable zero-knowledge, resettable soundness, proofs of knowledge, public-key model

**Publication Info: **To appear in 42nd FOCS, 2001.

**Date: **received 7 Aug 2001, last revised 30 Mar 2006

**Contact author: **lindell at cs biu ac il

**Available format(s): **Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

**Version: **20060330:110555 (All versions of this report)

**Discussion forum: **Show discussion | Start new discussion

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]