Paper 2001/056
On the Complexity of Matsui's Attack
P. Junod
Abstract
Linear cryptanalysis remains the most powerful attack against DES at this time. Given $2^{43}$ known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, Matsui expected a complexity of less than $2^{43}$ DES evaluations in 85% of the cases for recovering the key. In this paper, we present a theoretical and experimental complexity analysis of this attack, which has been simulated 21 times using the idle time of several computers. The experimental results suggest a complexity upper-bounded by $2^{41}$ DES evaluations in 85% of the case, while more than the half of the experiments needed less than $2^{39}$ DES evaluations. In addition, we give a detailed theoretical analysis of the attack complexity.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. To be published in the proceedings of SAC '01
- Keywords
- DESlinear cryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- pascal junod @ epfl ch
- History
- 2001-08-30: revised
- 2001-07-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2001/056
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/056,
author = {P. Junod},
title = {On the Complexity of Matsui's Attack},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2001/056},
year = {2001},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/056}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/056}
}
