Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2001/053
Security Proofs for the RSA-PSS Signature Scheme and Its Variants
Abstract: We analyze the security of different versions of the adapted
RSA-PSS signature scheme, including schemes with variable salt
lengths and message recovery. We also examine a variant with
Rabin-Williams (RW) as the underlying verification primitive.
Our conclusion is that the security of RSA-PSS and RW-PSS in
the random oracle model can be tightly related to the hardness
of inverting the underlying RSA and RW primitives, at least if
the PSS salt length is reasonably large. Our security proofs
are based on already existing work by Bellare and Rogaway
and by Coron, who examined signature schemes based on the
original PSS encoding method.
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / digital signatures, factoring, public-key cryptography, RSA
Publication Info: An extended abstract of this paper is published in the proceedings of the Second Open NESSIE Workshop, 12-13 September 2001.
Date: received 27 Jun 2001, last revised 21 Mar 2002
Contact author: jjonsson at rsasecurity com
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20020321:143257 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2001/053
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