Paper 2001/037

EMpowering Side-Channel Attacks

Josyula R. Rao and Pankaj Rohatgi

Abstract

In this paper, we report preliminary results obtained as a result of a systematic investigation of leakage of compromising information via EM emanations from chipcards and other devices. Our findings show that the EM side--channel is more powerful than other side--channels such as timing and power analysis. Specifically, in some cases, one can obtain much more compromising information about computations and one can use this information to defeat the protection provided by countermeasures to the other side--channel attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
side-channel cryptanalysispower analysisEMF
Contact author(s)
jrrao @ us ibm com
History
2001-05-11: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2001/037
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/037,
      author = {Josyula R.  Rao and Pankaj Rohatgi},
      title = {EMpowering Side-Channel Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2001/037},
      year = {2001},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/037}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/037}
}
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