Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2001/037

EMpowering Side-Channel Attacks

Josyula R. Rao and Pankaj Rohatgi

Abstract: In this paper, we report preliminary results obtained as a result of a systematic investigation of leakage of compromising information via EM emanations from chipcards and other devices. Our findings show that the EM side--channel is more powerful than other side--channels such as timing and power analysis. Specifically, in some cases, one can obtain much more compromising information about computations and one can use this information to defeat the protection provided by countermeasures to the other side--channel attacks.

Category / Keywords: implementation / side-channel cryptanalysis, power analysis, EMF

Date: received 11 May 2001

Contact author: jrrao at us ibm com

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20010511:174847 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2001/037

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