Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2001/031
Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Human-Memorable Passwords
Jonathan Katz and Rafail Ostrovsky and Moti Yung
Abstract: We present an efficient password-authenticated key exchange protocol
which is secure against off-line dictionary attacks even when users
choose passwords from a very small space (say, a dictionary of English
words). We prove security in the standard model under the decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption, assuming public parameters generated by a
trusted party. Compared to the recent work of Goldreich and Lindell
(which was the first to give a secure construction, under general
assumptions, in the standard model), our protocol requires only 3
rounds and is efficient enough to be used in practice.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / key exchange, diffie-hellman, password
Publication Info: Eurocrypt, 2001.
Date: received 23 Apr 2001, last revised 26 Apr 2001
Contact author: jkatz at cs columbia edu
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Revised to indicate that this is an expanded version of the
paper that will appear at Eurocrypt 2001.
Version: 20010515:150529 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2001/031
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