Paper 2000/035

Electronic Jury Voting Protocols

Alejandro Hevia and Marcos Kiwi

Abstract

This work elicits the fact that all current proposals for electronic voting schemes disclose the final tally of the votes. In certain situations, like jury voting, this may be undesirable. We present a robust and universally verifiable Membership Testing Scheme (MTS) that allows, among other things, a collection of voters to cast votes and determine whether their tally belongs to some pre--specified set (e.g., exceeds a given threshold) --- our scheme discloses no additional information than that implied from the knowledge of such membership. We discuss several extensions of our basic MTS. All the constructions presented combine features of two parallel lines of research concerning electronic voting schemes, those based on MIX--networks and in homomorphic encryption.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
membership tetingMIX-networksmajority votingelection scheme
Contact author(s)
mkiwi @ dim uchile cl
History
2000-07-18: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2000/035
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2000/035,
      author = {Alejandro Hevia and Marcos Kiwi},
      title = {Electronic Jury Voting Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2000/035},
      year = {2000},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/035}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/035}
}
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