Paper 2000/015
Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks
Mihir Bellare, Marc Fischlin, Shafi Goldwasser, and Silvio Micali
Abstract
We provide identification protocols that are secure even when the adversary can reset the internal state and/or randomization source of the user identifying itself, and when executed in an asynchronous environment like the Internet that gives the adversary concurrent access to instances of the user. These protocols are suitable for use by devices (like smartcards) which when under adversary control may not be able to reliably maintain their internal state between invocations.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Extended abstract appeared in proceedings of Eurocrypt 2001. This is the full version.
- Keywords
- identificationentity authenticationresetconcurrencyzero-knowledgesignaturesencryption
- Contact author(s)
- mihir @ cs ucsd edu
- History
- 2001-09-20: revised
- 2000-04-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2000/015
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2000/015,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Marc Fischlin and Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali},
title = {Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2000/015},
year = {2000},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/015}
}
