Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2000/015

Identification Protocols Secure Against Reset Attacks

Mihir Bellare and Marc Fischlin and Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali

Abstract: We provide identification protocols that are secure even when the adversary can reset the internal state and/or randomization source of the user identifying itself, and when executed in an asynchronous environment like the Internet that gives the adversary concurrent access to instances of the user. These protocols are suitable for use by devices (like smartcards) which when under adversary control may not be able to reliably maintain their internal state between invocations.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / identification, entity authentication, reset, concurrency, zero-knowledge, signatures, encryption

Publication Info: Extended abstract appeared in proceedings of Eurocrypt 2001. This is the full version.

Date: received 28 Apr 2000, last revised 20 Sep 2001

Contact author: mihir at cs ucsd edu

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20011015:224509 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2000/015

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