Paper 2000/010
The Security of Chaffing and Winnowing
Mihir Bellare and Alexandra Boldyreva
Abstract
This paper takes a closer look at Rivest's chaffing-and-winnowing paradigm for data privacy. We begin with a \textit{definition} which enables one to determine clearly whether a given scheme qualifies as ``chaffing-and-winnowing.'' We then analyze Rivest's schemes to see what quality of data privacy they provide. His simplest scheme is easily proven secure but is ineffient. The security of his more efficient scheme ---based on all-or-nothing transforms (AONTs)--- is however more problematic. It can be attacked under Rivest's definition of security of an AONT, and even under stronger notions does not appear provable. We show however that by using a OAEP as the AONT one can prove security. We also present a different scheme, still using AONTs, that is equally efficient and easily proven secure even under the original weak notion of security of AONTs.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Message authenticationsymmetric
- Contact author(s)
- mihir @ cs ucsd edu
- History
- 2000-04-06: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2000/010
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2000/010,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Alexandra Boldyreva},
title = {The Security of Chaffing and Winnowing},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2000/010},
year = {2000},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/010}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/010}
}
