Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 1999/015
Interleaved Zero-Knowledge in the Public-Key Model
Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali
Abstract: We introduce the notion of Interleaved Zero-Knowledge (iZK), a new
security measure for cryptographic protocols which strengthens
the classical notion of zero-knowledge, in a way suitable for
multiple concurrent executions in an asynchronous environment
like the internet. We prove that iZK protocols are robust:
they are ``parallelizable'', and preserve security when run
concurrently in a fully asynchronous network. Furthermore,
this holds even if the prover's random-pads in all these
concurrent invocations are identical. Thus, iZK protocols are
ideal for smart-cards and other devices which cannot reliably
Category / Keywords: Zero-Knowledge, Concurrent Zero-Knowledge, Witness-Indistinguishable Proofs, Parralel Composition, Smart Cards, Identification Schemes, Commitment Schemes, The Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Publication Info: Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
Date: received June 26th, 1999. Revised July 9th, 1999. Also posted on ECCC as TR99-024. Superceded by Theory of Cryptography Library Record 99-22.
Contact author: oded at wisdom weizmann ac il
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | BibTeX Citation
Short URL: ia.cr/1999/015
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