Paper 1999/015

Interleaved Zero-Knowledge in the Public-Key Model

Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, and Silvio Micali

Abstract

We introduce the notion of Interleaved Zero-Knowledge (iZK), a new security measure for cryptographic protocols which strengthens the classical notion of zero-knowledge, in a way suitable for multiple concurrent executions in an asynchronous environment like the internet. We prove that iZK protocols are robust: they are ``parallelizable'', and preserve security when run concurrently in a fully asynchronous network. Furthermore, this holds even if the prover's random-pads in all these concurrent invocations are identical. Thus, iZK protocols are ideal for smart-cards and other devices which cannot reliably

Metadata
Available format(s)
PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
Keywords
Zero-KnowledgeConcurrent Zero-KnowledgeWitness-Indistinguishable ProofsParralel CompositionSmart CardsIdentification SchemesCommitment SchemesThe Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Contact author(s)
oded @ wisdom weizmann ac il
History
1999-07-09: revised
1999-06-26: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/1999/015
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:1999/015,
      author = {Oded Goldreich and Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali},
      title = {Interleaved Zero-Knowledge in the Public-Key Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 1999/015},
      year = {1999},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/1999/015}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/1999/015}
}
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