Paper 1999/006

Fast Proof of Plaintext-Knowledge and Deniable Authentication Based on Chinese Remainder Theorem

Roger Fischlin

Abstract

We propose a fast and communication-efficient proof of plaintext-knowledge (PPTK) protocol based on the Chinese Remainder theorem. With a PPTK the receiver of a ciphertext verifies that the sender knows the corresponding cleartext in such a way that a dishonest sender or an eavesdropper does not learn anything about the plaintext except with sub-polynomial probability. We turn any semantically secure public key cryptosystem into an efficient (interactive) one which is immune against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks by adding the PPTK protocol. Using our PPTK protocol we also derive an efficient protocol for deniable authentication.

Metadata
Available format(s)
-- withdrawn --
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
Keywords
Chinese Remainder TheoremChosen Ciphertext AttacksDeniable AuthenticationNon-Malleable CryptographyProof of Plaintext-KnowledgePublic Key Cryptosystem
Contact author(s)
fischlin @ haendel mi informatik uni-frankfurt de
History
1999-04-19: withdrawn
1999-03-05: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/1999/006
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.