Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 1999/006
Fast Proof of Plaintext-Knowledge and Deniable Authentication Based on Chinese Remainder Theorem
Abstract: We propose a fast and communication-efficient proof of
plaintext-knowledge (PPTK) protocol based on the Chinese Remainder
theorem. With a PPTK the receiver of a ciphertext verifies that the
sender knows the corresponding cleartext in such a way that a
dishonest sender or an eavesdropper does not learn anything about
the plaintext except with sub-polynomial probability. We turn any
semantically secure public key cryptosystem into an efficient
(interactive) one which is immune against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks by adding the PPTK protocol. Using our PPTK protocol we also
derive an efficient protocol for deniable authentication.
Category / Keywords: Chinese Remainder Theorem, Chosen Ciphertext Attacks, Deniable Authentication, Non-Malleable Cryptography, Proof of Plaintext-Knowledge, Public Key Cryptosystem
Publication Info: Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
Date: received March 5, 1999, withdrawn April 19, 1999.
Contact author: fischlin at haendel mi informatik uni-frankfurt de
Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)
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