Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 1998/021

Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes

Mihir Bellare,Anand Desai, David Pointcheval and Phillip Rogaway

Abstract: We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of indistinguishability and non-malleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove either an implication (every scheme meeting one notion must meet the other) or a separation (there is a scheme meeting one notion but not the other, assuming the first notion can be met at all). We similarly treat plaintext awareness, a notion of security in the random oracle model. An additional contribution of this paper is a new definition of non-malleability which we believe is simpler than the previous one.

Category / Keywords: Encryption, semantic security, non-malleability, chosen ciphertext attack, plaintext awareness.

Publication Info: Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.

Date: received June 17th, 1998.

Contact author: mihir at cs edu

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