Paper 1998/011
The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited
Ran Canetti, Oded Goldreich, and Shai Halevi
Abstract
We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called "cryptographic hash functions". The main result of this paper is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random oracle results in insecure schemes. In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion of a "good implementation" of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
- Keywords
- correlation intractabilityCS proofsencryption and signature schemesthe random-oracle model
- Contact author(s)
- shaih @ watson ibm com
- History
- 2003-08-04: revised
- 2003-08-04: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/1998/011
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:1998/011,
author = {Ran Canetti and Oded Goldreich and Shai Halevi},
title = {The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 1998/011},
year = {1998},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/1998/011}
}
