Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 1997/007
Towards realizing random oracles: Hash functions that hide all partial information
Abstract: The random oracle model is a very convenient setting for designing
cryptographic protocols. In this idealized model all parties have access
to a common, public random function, called a random oracle.
Protocols in this model are often very simple and efficient; also the
analysis is often clearer. However, we do not have a general mechanism for
transforming protocols that are secure in the random oracle model into
protocols that are secure in real life. In fact, we do not even know how
to meaningfully specify the properties required from such a mechanism.
Instead, it is a common practice to simply replace - often without
mathematical justification - the random oracle with a `cryptographic hash
function' (e.g., MD5 or SHA). Consequently, the resulting protocols have
no meaningful proofs of security.
Category / Keywords: Random oracles, Hash functions, Collision resistance, Semantic security
Publication Info: Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
Date: received June 2nd, 1997.
Contact author: canetti at watson ibm com
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | BibTeX Citation
Short URL: ia.cr/1997/007
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