Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 1996/012
Yair Frankel, Peter Gemmell, Philip D. MacKenzie, Moti Yung
Abstract: We consider a "mobile adversary" which may corrupt all
participants throughout the lifetime of the system in a non-monotonic
fashion (i.e. recoveries are possible) but the adversary is unable to
corrupt too many participants during any short time period.
Schemes resiliant to such adverasry are called proactive.
We present a proactive RSA system in which a threshold of servers
applies the RSA signature (or decryption) function in a distributed manner.
Employing new combinatorial and elementary number theoretic
techniques, our protocol enables the dynamic updating
of the servers (which hold the RSA key distributively);
it is secure even when a linear number of
the servers are corrupted during any time period;
it efficiently "self-maintains" the
security of the function and its
messages (ciphertexts or signatures); and it enables continuous
availability, namely, correct function application using the shared
key is possible at any time.
Category / Keywords:
Publication Info: Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
Date: received Aug 5th, 1996.
Contact author: yair at cs sandia gov
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | BibTeX Citation
Short URL: ia.cr/1996/012
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