Let Attackers Program Ideal Models: Modularity and Composability for Adaptive Compromise

Joseph Jaeger

Paper 2024/727

Let Attackers Program Ideal Models: Modularity and Composability for Adaptive Compromise

Joseph Jaeger

, Georgia Institute of Technology

Abstract

We show that the adaptive compromise security definitions of Jaeger and Tyagi (Crypto '20) cannot be applied in several natural use-cases. These include proving multi-user security from single-user security, the security of the cascade PRF, and the security of schemes sharing the same ideal primitive. We provide new variants of the definitions and show that they resolve these issues with composition. Extending these definitions to the asymmetric settings, we establish the security of the modular KEM/DEM and Fujisaki-Okamoto approaches to public key encryption in the full adaptive compromise setting. This allows instantiations which are more efficient and standard than prior constructions.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Foundations
Publication info: A major revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2023
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-30620-4_4
Keywords: Adaptive Security Ideal Models Provable Security Selective Opening Attacks Non-Committing Encryption
Contact author(s): josephjaeger @ gatech edu
History: 2024-05-13: approved; 2024-05-12: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2024/727
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/727,
      author = {Joseph Jaeger},
      title = {Let Attackers Program Ideal Models: Modularity and Composability for Adaptive Compromise},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/727},
      year = {2024},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-30620-4_4},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/727}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/727}
}