Fast Secure Comparison for Medium-Sized Integers and Its Application in Binarized Neural Networks

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Abstract. In 1994, Feige, Kilian, and Naor proposed a simple protocol for secure 3-way comparison of integers a and b from the range $[0, 2]$. Their observation is that for $p = 7$, the Legendre symbol $(x \mid p)$ coincides with the sign of x for $x = a - b \in [-2, 2]$, thus reducing secure comparison to secure evaluation of the Legendre symbol. More recently, in 2011, Yu generalized this idea to handle secure comparisons for integers from substantially larger ranges $[0, d]$, essentially by searching for primes for which the Legendre symbol coincides with the sign function on $[-d, d]$. In this paper, we present new comparison protocols based on the Legendre symbol that additionally employ some form of error correction. We relax the prime search by requiring that the Legendre symbol encodes the sign function in a noisy fashion only. Practically, we use the majority vote over a window of $2k + 1$ adjacent Legendre symbols, for small positive integers k. Our technique significantly increases the comparison range: e.g., for a modulus of 60 bits, d increases by a factor of 2.9 (for $k = 1$) and 5.4 (for $k = 2$) respectively. We give a practical method to find primes with suitable noisy encodings.

We demonstrate the practical relevance of our comparison protocol by applying it in a secure neural network classifier for the MNIST dataset. Concretely, we discuss a secure multiparty computation based on the binarized multi-layer perceptron of Hubara et al., using our comparison for the second and third layers.

1 Introduction

Secure integer comparison has been a primitive of particular interest since the inception of multiparty computation (MPC). In 1982, even before general multiparty computation had been realized, Yao introduced the millionaires' problem, in which two millionaires want to determine who of them is richer without revealing any information beyond the outcome of this comparison to each other or to any third party [21]. Secure comparison has been investigated extensively since. A whole range of solutions is available with every solution aiming for a particular trade-off. Nonetheless, for arithmetic MPC schemes—as opposed to MPC

schemes for Boolean circuits—secure comparison remains among the most expensive basic operations. Hence, for applications that require many comparisons, achieving high throughput (important for privacy-preserving data processing applications) or low latency (crucial for certain applications, like blind auctions for real-time advertisement sales) can be challenging.

1.1 Related Work

Whereas most secure comparison protocols work over finite fields of arbitrary order, Yu [22] presents a comparison protocol that only works for specifically chosen prime moduli. Although this clearly poses a restriction in terms of applicability, the main benefit is that the specifically chosen prime modulus p enables Yu to perform a comparison *in a single round of communication* in the online phase (the offline preprocessing phase requires three communication rounds), albeit in a range that is small compared to p (see Section 3.5 for explicit bounds). Namely, he chooses p such that the pattern of quadratic residues and non-residues modulo p coincides with the sign function on a given interval symmetric around zero, which is an idea that goes back to a protocol due to Feige, Kilian, and Naor [3], who use it to compute the sign of an element $x \in [-2, 2]$ in $\mathbb{Z}/7\mathbb{Z}$. Yu's comparison protocol for comparing arbitrary elements $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ essentially works by breaking up the full-range comparison into several medium-range comparisons of the above type by performing a digit decomposition.

1.2 This Paper

In this paper, we pursue the line of work initiated by Yu [22]. Our main contribution is that we achieve an improvement in the comparison range while keeping the bit length of the prime modulus fixed. Concretely, we propose a protocol that, for a fixed prime-length, achieves roughly a *three-fold increase of the comparison range* (over Yu's results), while still enjoying a single-round online phase, at the cost of a constant amount of additional communication and some additional local computations. Also, we present a two-online-rounds protocol that achieves roughly a *five-fold increase in the comparison range* when compared to Yu's approach. In other words, to compare two integers that lie in a given range (symmetric around zero), our methods require a smaller prime than the prime required for the protocol from [22]. Keeping the finite-field modulus as small as possible or within the machine's word size could be important, for example, in a setting where MPC protocols run on constrained hardware platforms. On such platforms, the complexity of prime-field arithmetic (which is directly related to the prime size) can have a significant impact on the runtime performance. Our protocols can be found in Section 5.

The main idea is to somewhat relax the constraints on the prime modulus p: instead of requiring that the Legendre symbols of *all* elements in the interval $[-d, d]$, for a given positive integer d, coincide with the sign function, we only require this coincidence for *most* elements (in a specific sense). Let us, for some fixed prime p, say that there is an *error* at position $x \in [-d, d]$ if $(x \mid p) \neq \operatorname{sgn}(x)$.

Our improvement is based on exploiting a "local redundancy" property enjoyed by the sign function that lets us correct such errors as long as they are sufficiently "sparse", by means of inspecting also the Legendre symbols of some neighboring positions and then performing a majority vote.

This new approach raises the question of how to find primes that give rise to increased ranges. In Section 4, we present some results that considerably simplify this search, including tables of suitable primes for various bit lengths, and leave as an open problem to prove asymptotic lower and upper bounds on the growth of the comparison range in the prime's bit length.

1.3 Application: Efficient Neural Network Evaluation in MPC

To demonstrate the practical value of our work, we apply our new comparison protocol to the problem of securely evaluating a neural network, in which the sign function is used as non-linearity. We use a binarized multi-layer perceptron (BMLP) for recognizing handwritten digits, as described in [7], which is trained (in the clear) on the well-known MNIST handwritten-digits data set. We consider an MPC scenario in which the input images are secret-shared between the parties, which then securely evaluate the BMLP to obtain the estimated digit in secret-shared form.

2 Preliminaries

Integer Intervals. Whenever we write $[a, b]$, unless stated otherwise, we mean the *integer* interval $\{a, \ldots, b\} \subset \mathbb{Z}$, which is empty if $a > b$. The half-open interval $(a, b]$ is defined as $[a + 1, b]$.

Arithmetic Black Box. We suppose that we are given a secure arithmetic black-box (ABB) functionality that can securely evaluate multiplication and linear forms over the finite field $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. We write $[\![x]\!]$ for the value $x \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ encrypted under the ABB (e.g., x is secret-shared among a set of parties, or perhaps encrypted under some homomorphic encryption scheme). Abusing notation, for small $x \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ we will also refer to x as an integer in $\mathbb{Z}$, given as the canonical lift of the residue class modulo p to the integers $\left[-\left\lfloor \frac{p}{2} \right\rfloor, \left\lfloor \frac{p}{2} \right\rfloor\right]$.

Sign vs. Binary Sign. The sign function and the binary sign function are respectively defined as

$$
\operatorname{sgn}(z) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } z > 0, \\ 0 & \text{if } z = 0, \\ -1 & \text{if } z < 0. \end{cases} \qquad \operatorname{bsgn}(z) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } z \geq 0, \\ -1 & \text{if } z < 0. \end{cases}
$$

Comparing two integers a and b is achieved by evaluating the sign (or bsgn) of their difference $a - b$. The sgn function gives rise to a three-way comparison, while the bsgn function corresponds to two-way comparison. In this paper, we

will start our analysis in terms of the sgn function, but for reasons that will become clear later our protocols evaluate the bsgn function (i.e., achieve two-way comparison). We will sometimes be a bit sloppy and use the word "sign" also for the bsgn function; the precise meaning should nonetheless still be clear from its context.

The Legendre symbol. Recall that for any odd prime p and any integer a, the Legendre symbol is defined as

$$(a \mid p) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } a \equiv 0 \pmod{p}, \\ 1 & \text{if } a \text{ is a quadratic residue modulo } p, \\ -1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The Legendre symbol is a completely multiplicative function, which means that $(a \mid p)(b \mid p) = (ab \mid p)$ for all $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$, and for any integer a the value of $(a \mid p)$ only depends on $[a]_p$, the residue class of a modulo p. The identity $(a \mid p) \equiv a^{\frac{p-1}{2}}$ $\pmod{p}$ is known as *Euler's criterion*. The *law of quadratic reciprocity* asserts that for odd primes p and q,

$$(p \mid q)(q \mid p) = (-1)^{\frac{p-1}{2} \frac{q-1}{2}}.$$

Securely evaluating Legendre symbols. In principle, we can securely evaluate the Legendre symbol via Euler's criterion, which would require $O(\log p)$ secure multiplications. The complete multiplicativity of the Legendre symbol enables the following constant-rounds protocol for securely evaluating the Legendre symbol in the preprocessing model with an single-round online phase. In the preprocessing phase, we generate a secret-shared pair $(\llbracket r \rrbracket, \llbracket (r \mid p) \rrbracket)$ of a random non-zero r together with its Legendre symbol. In the online (input-dependent) phase, we securely multiply $\llbracket a \rrbracket \cdot \llbracket r \rrbracket$, open the result and then compute

$$\llbracket (a \mid p) \rrbracket = (ar \mid p) \llbracket (r \mid p) \rrbracket.$$

Note that the security of the protocol requires that $a \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$, which should be taken into account when using this protocol.

Blum primes. A prime p for which $p \equiv 3 \pmod 4$ is called a *Blum prime*. By Euler's criterion, -1 is a quadratic non-residue modulo p if and only if p is a Blum prime. Hence, for any Blum prime p, the map $x \mapsto (x \mid p)$ is an odd function for $x \in [-\lfloor p/2 \rfloor, \lfloor p/2 \rfloor]$ (which follows immediately from the multiplicativity of the Legendre symbol), i.e., it enjoys the same symmetry around the origin as the sign function.

3 Evaluating the Sign Function using Legendre Symbols

3.1 Redundancy Property of the Sign Function

In this section we show that the sign function enjoys a "local redundancy" property, which lets us correct sign-flip errors by means of majority-decoding as long as those errors occur sparsely (in a sense defined below).

Definition 1. *Let $k \geq 0$ be an integer, and let $\mathcal{T} = [t_1, t_2]$ be an interval of integers with $t_2 - t_1 \geq 2k$. We say that a function $e : \mathcal{T} \to \{0, 1\}$ is an* error function *on $\mathcal{T}$* admissible *for k if $e(x) = 0$ for all $x \in [-(k+1), k+1] \cap \mathcal{T}$ and if $\sum_{i=-k}^{k} e(y + i) \leq k$ holds for all $y \in [t_1 + k, t_2 - k]$.*

Lemma 1. *Let k and $\mathcal{T}$ be as in Definition 1, and let e be an error function on $\mathcal{T}$ admissible for k. Then,*

$$\mathrm{sgn}\left(\sum_{i=-k}^{k} (-1)^{e(x+i)} \mathrm{sgn}(x + i) \right) = \mathrm{sgn}(x)$$

holds for all $x \in [t_1 + k, t_2 - k]$.

The proof will clarify why we require in Definition 1 that an admissible error function $e(x)$ has an "error-free" region around $x = 0$; informally speaking, the reason is that the sign function undergoes its sign change at $x = 0$, which means that there is "less room" for errors under majority-decoding in this region.

Proof. We will prove the statement for $\mathcal{T} = [-a, a]$ where $a \geq k$ is any integer. This implies the claim for any subinterval of $\mathcal{T}$ of cardinality at least $2k+1$. Note that because of symmetry (in the sign function as well as in the definition of an admissible error function), it suffices to prove the statement for $x \geq 0$. We distinguish three cases for x. If $x = 0$, we have $\sum_{i=-k}^{k}(-1)^{e(i)}\mathrm{sgn}(i) = \sum_{i=-k}^{k}\mathrm{sgn}(i) = \mathrm{sgn}(x) = 0$, where the first equality follows because e is admissible for k and the second equality follows from the fact that summing an odd function over an interval symmetric around zero gives the value zero.

Second, if $x > k$, we have

$$\sum_{i=-k}^{k} (-1)^{e(x+i)} \mathrm{sgn}(x + i) = \sum_{i=-k}^{k} (-1)^{e(x+i)} > 0,$$

where the equality follows because $\mathrm{sgn}(x + i) = 1$ for all $i \in [-k, k]$ and the inequality follows because e is admissible for k.

For the third (and final) case, suppose that $x \in [1, k]$. We have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\sum_{i=-k}^{k} (-1)^{e(x+i)} \mathrm{sgn}(x + i) &= \sum_{i=-k}^{k-x+1} \mathrm{sgn}(x + i) + \sum_{i'=k-x+2}^{k} (-1)^{e(x+i')} \mathrm{sgn}(x + i') \\
&= \sum_{j=x-k}^{k+1} \mathrm{sgn}(j) + \sum_{j'=k+2}^{k+x} (-1)^{e(j')} \mathrm{sgn}(j') \\
&= 1 + x + \sum_{j'=k+2}^{k+x} (-1)^{e(j')} \\
&\geq (1 + x) + (1 - x) = 2
\end{aligned}
$$

$\square$

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Fig. 1: Finite state machine generating bit strings with at most one 1 in every three consecutive bits.

3.2 Counting Admissible Error Functions

How many admissible error functions can there be on a given set $\mathcal{T}$ and for a given integer k? In this section, we will give an upper bound for $k = 1$. To prove the upper bound, we will need the following lemma, which is well known.

Lemma 2 ("Volume Bound for Hamming Balls"). *Let $\mathcal{S}_n$ be the set of all bit sequences of length n produced using by concatenating bits from a binary source X. Then, it holds that*

$$2^{H(X)n - o(n)} \leq |\mathcal{S}_n| \leq 2^{H(X)n}$$

where $H(X)$ denotes the Shannon entropy of X.

In Figure 1, we show a finite state machine (FSM) that defines a language of bit strings such that every string in the language has the following property: for every window of three consecutive bit positions, at most one position will be "1". If we impose a probability distribution on the outgoing edges of state (a), then we can view the FSM as a random binary source, which lets us compute the entropy which we need to apply Lemma 2.

Proposition 1. *Let $\mathcal{T} := [-t, t]$ with $t \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $t \geq 2$. Let $\mathcal{E}_1$ be the set of all error functions on $\mathcal{T}$ admissible for $k = 1$. Then,*

$$|\mathcal{E}_1| \leq 2^{t-2}.$$

Proof. For all error functions $e \in \mathcal{E}_1$, it holds by definition that $e(x) = 0$ for $x \in [-2, 2]$. We may choose the function values on remaining positions, that is, the intervals $[3, t]$ and $[-t, -3]$, freely under the constraint that $e(x - 1) + e(x) + e(x + 1) \leq 1$ for all $x \in [-t + 1, t - 1]$. In each such interval, there are, according to Lemma 2, $N \leq 2^{\lambda(t-2)}$ choices, with $\lambda := H(X)$, the entropy rate of the FSM in Figure 1. It is easy to see that $H(X) = 1/2$: namely, the binary decision in state a corresponds to *one* bit of entropy but produces on average *two* output bits (either the length-1 output "0" or the length-3 output sequence "100"). Because the choices for the two intervals are independent, in total there are N^2 choices for e, hence $|\mathcal{E}_1| \leq 2^{t-2}$. $\qquad\square$

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3.3 The Legendre Symbol as a "Noisy" Sign

Suppose that p is a Blum prime. We can view the Legendre symbol $(x \mid p)$ for $x \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ as a "noisy" version of the sign of x:

$$(x \mid p) = (-1)^{e(x)}\mathrm{sgn}(x), \tag{1}$$

where $e(x)$ is the error function that is determined by p. If we now plug (1) into Lemma 1, we can conclude that we may compute the sign of x as the sign of the sum of the Legendre symbols of positions in a length-$(2k+1)$ interval centered at x, for all $x \in [t_1 + k, t_2 - k]$, if e is an error function on the interval $[t_1, t_2]$ admissible for k.

Because p is a Blum prime, the pattern of Legendre symbols has odd symmetry, which implies that we can w.l.o.g. define $\mathcal{T}$ such that it is symmetric around zero. A natural question, for a given Blum prime p, non-negative integer k, and $\mathcal{T} = [-d, d]$ for a positive integer $d \geq k$, is how large d can maximally be such that e is an error function on $\mathcal{T}$ that is admissible for k. This gives rise to the following equivalent definition, in which we leave the error function implicit.

Definition 2. *Let k be a non-negative integer, and let $p > 2k + 1$ be a Blum prime. We define the k-range of p, denoted $d_k(p)$, to be the largest integer d such that for all integers x with $1 \leq x \leq d$ it holds that*

$$\sum_{i=-k}^{k} (x + i \mid p) > 0, \tag{2}$$

and we set $d_k(p) = 0$ if no such d exists.

Note that $d_0(p)$ tells us the maximum size of Yu's "Consecutive Quadratic Residues and Non-Residues Sign Module" for a given prime p, i.e., in Yu's terminology and notation: a Blum prime p *qualifies* for $\pm\ell$-CQRN for all $\ell \leq d_0(p)$.

Lower bound on $d_k(p)$. If $p > 2k + 1$ and $d_0(p) > k$, then $d_k(p) \geq d_0(p)$.

Example. Let us illustrate Definition 2 by means of an example. Let us take $p = 23$; note that this is a Blum prime. Below, we have evaluated the first 16 Legendre symbols.

x	0	1	2	3	4		5	6		7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	$\ldots$
$(x \mid p)$	0	1	1	1	1		-1	1		-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	

We can now read off that $d_0(23) = 4$. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that $d_1(23) = 5$, $d_2(23) = 8$, and $d_3(23) = 7$.

3.4 Avoiding Zero by Restricting to Odd Positions

As mentioned in the preliminaries, if we use the single-online-round protocol for securely evaluating the Legendre symbol, we may not evaluate the Legendre symbol on the zero element. A simple trick to avoid zero (also used in [22]) is to restrict to evaluation of odd inputs by using the map $x \mapsto 2x + 1$. Note that this implies that we cannot compute $\text{sgn}(x)$ using the single-online-round protocol; instead we will evaluate $\text{bsgn}(x)$. Removing the conditions on the Legendre symbols at even positions gives rise to the following definition.

Definition 3. *Let k be a non-negative integer, and let $p > 2k + 1$ be a Blum prime. We define $d_k^*(p)$ as the largest integer d such that for all integers x with $1 \leq x \leq d$ it holds that*

$$\sum_{i=-k}^{k} (2(x+i) + 1 \mid p) > 0, \tag{3}$$

and we set $d_k^*(p) = 0$ if no such d exists.

Note that for any Blum prime p for which $d_0(p) > 1$ (which implies that $d_0(p)$ is even), it is easy to see that it holds that $d_0^*(p) = \frac{1}{2}d_0(p) - 1$. For $k > 0$, such simple relations do not seem to exist. This means, for example, that a prime p that gives rise to a high value for $d_1(p)$, does not necessarily give a high value for $d_1^*(p)$, and vice versa.

3.5 Bounds on $d_0(p)$

The value $d_0(p)$ can be interpreted as the position just before the appearance of the first quadratic non-residue. Let $n_1(p)$ denote the smallest quadratic non-residue. Finding bounds on $n_1(p)$ is a well-known problem in number theory, with important contributions from Polyà, Vinogradov and Burgess, among others. The best explicit upper bound that is currently known (for p a Blum prime) is due to Treviño [19]:

$$d_0(p) + 1 = n_1(p) \leq 1.1 \sqrt[4]{p} \log p.$$

Graham and Ringrose [5] proved an unconditional asymptotic lower bound (improving on a previous result by, independently,[4] Fridlender [4] and Salié [14]), namely, that there exist infinitely many primes for which

$$d_0(p) + 1 = n_1(p) \geq c \cdot \log(p) \cdot \log \log \log p.$$

for some absolute constant c.[5]

Lamzouri *et al.* [10] prove that conditional on the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis, for all primes $p \geq 5$ it holds that

$$d_0(p) + 1 = n_1(p) < (\log p)^2.$$

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[4] Ankeny [2] attributes this result to Chowla, but does not provide a reference.

[5] In the literature, this is also written as $n_1(p) = \Omega(\log(p) \cdot \log \log \log p)$, where Ω is Hardy–Littlewood's Big Omega: $f(n) = \Omega(g(n)) \iff \limsup_{n \to \infty} |f(n)/g(n)| > 0$.

3.6 Bounds on $d_1(p)$

Hudson [8] proves an upper bound on the least *pair* of quadratic non-residues. Formally, let $n_2(p)$ be the smallest value such that $n_2(p)$ and $n_2(p) + 1$ are quadratic non-residues. For $k = 1$, it must hold that $d_1(p) < n_2(p)$, because an "error pattern" consisting of two consecutive quadratic non-residues (such that $n_2(p) \in [1, (p-3)/2]$) cannot be corrected using a majority vote in a window of length $2k + 1 = 3$. Hudson's bound is as follows. For every $p \geq 5$ we have that

$$d_1(p) < n_2(p) \leq (n_1(p) - 1)q_2,$$

where q_2 is the second smallest prime that is a quadratic non-residue modulo p.

Hildebrand [6] proves another upper bound on $n_2(p)$: for every $\epsilon > 0$ there exists a constant p_0 such that for all $p \geq p_0$,

$$d_1(p) < n_2(p) \leq p^{1/(4\sqrt{e})+\epsilon}.$$

Sun [17] gives a construction for generating all elements n in $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ such that n and $n + 1$ are quadratic non-residues.

Lemma 3 ([17]). *Let p be an odd prime and let g be a primitive root of p. Then,*

$$\mathcal{U} := \left\{ n \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \mid (n \mid p) = (n + 1 \mid p) = -1 \right\}$$
$$= \left\{ u_k \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \mid u_k \equiv \frac{(g^{2k-1} - 1)^2}{4g^{2k-1}} \mod p, \quad k = 1, \ldots, \left\lfloor \frac{p-1}{4} \right\rfloor \right\}$$

We can interpret this lemma as giving a collection of upper bounds on $d_1(p)$, that is, $d_1(p) < n_2(p) \leq u_k$ holds for every $k = 1, \ldots, \lfloor (p-1)/4 \rfloor$.

An error pattern that consists of two quadratic non-residues that are separated by one arbitrary position can also not be corrected using a majority vote in a window of length $2k+1 = 3$. Inspired by Sun, we prove the following lemma.

Lemma 4. *Let p be a Blum prime, let $b = \big((2 \mid p) + 1\big)/2 \in \{0, 1\}$ and let g be a primitive root of p. Then,*

$$\mathcal{V} := \left\{ n \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \mid (n \mid p) = (n + 2 \mid p) = -1 \right\}$$
$$= \left\{ v_k \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \mid v_k \equiv \frac{(g^{2k-b} - 1)^2}{2g^{2k-b}} \mod p, \quad k = 1, \ldots, (p-3)/4 \right\}.$$

Also this lemma can be viewed as giving a collection of upper bounds on $d_1(p)$. If $(n \mid p) = (n + 2 \mid p) = -1$, then a decoding error (under majority decoding with $k = 1$) will occur at position $n + 1$, hence we have that $d_1(p) \leq v_k$ holds (instead of strict inequality) for every $k = 1, \ldots, (p-3)/4$.

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Proof. Let $\chi(x) = (x \mid p)$ for all $x \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$. Jacobsthal [9] proves that for p a Blum prime,

$$\left|\{n \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \mid \chi(n) = \chi(n+2) = -1 \ \wedge \ \chi(n+1) = 1\}\right| = \frac{p-1+2\,(2 \mid p)}{8},$$

$$\text{and} \quad \left|\{n \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \mid \chi(n) = \chi(n+1) = \chi(n+2) = -1\}\right| = \frac{p-5-2\,(2 \mid p)}{8}.$$

Hence, by summing the cardinalities of the above sets, we get that

$$\left|\{n \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \mid \chi(n) = \chi(n+2) = -1\}\right| = \frac{p-3}{4}.$$

For $j = 1, 2, \ldots, (p-3)/2$, let $r_j \equiv (g^j - 1)^2/(2g^j) \mod p$. Then, $r_j + 2 \equiv (g^j + 1)^2/(2g^j) \mod p$. It now follows that $\chi(r_j) = \chi(r_j + 2) = (-1)^j \chi(2)$ for all $j = 1, 2, \ldots, (p-3)/2$. Hence, $\chi(r_{2k-(\chi(2)+1)/2}) = \chi(r_{2k-(\chi(2)+1)/2} + 2) = -1$ for all $k = 1, 2, \ldots, (p-3)/4$.

It remains to prove that $r_s \not\equiv r_t \mod p$ for all $s, t \in [1, (p-3)/2]$ with $t \neq s$; for this part we can re-use Sun's proof technique used in the proof of Lemma 3. Namely, for all $s, t \in [1, (p-3)/2]$ with $t \neq s$, we have that $g^{s+t} \not\equiv 1 \mod p$ (since g is a primitive root), which implies that $g^s - g^t \not\equiv (g^s - g^t)/g^{s+t} \mod p$. Hence, $g^s + g^{-s} \not\equiv g^t + g^{-t} \mod p$ from which we obtain that $r_s \not\equiv r_t \mod p$. We can now conclude that

$$\{n \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \mid \chi(n) = \chi(n+2) = -1\} = \{r_{2k-b} \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z} \mid k \in [1, (p-3)/4]\},$$

and the claim follows. $\qquad\square$

4 Finding a Prime for a Given k-Range

In order to find a prime that, for given integers k and D_k, gives rise to $d_k(p) \geq D_k$, we could in principle take a naive approach by letting a computer exhaustively enumerate the primes in increasing order and compute the Legendre symbols at $a = 1, \ldots, D_k$, and stop when they are all 1. Although this approach works for small values of k and D_k (say for $D_1 < 200$), for larger D_k this will become intractable.

We can speed up the calculation of d_k by using the multiplicativity of the Legendre symbol, the law of quadratic reciprocity and the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Moreover, we may speed up the computation by enumerating over values p that already satisfy some conditions on the Legendre symbols, using a *wheel data structure* [13,16]. We will first review the problem for the case $k = 0$ and then extend the method to the case $k = 1$. Our approach also works for arbitrary k, and we supply the relevant extensions, but we note that its practicality rapidly diminishes as k increases.

4.1 Finding Primes with High $d_0(p)$

Recall that finding a prime p' such that $d_0(p') \geq D$ means that p' must be a Blum prime such that the elements $1, \ldots, D$ are quadratic residues modulo p'. By the complete multiplicativity of the Legendre symbol, it suffices to find a Blum prime p such that all primes $q \leq D$ are quadratic residues modulo p.

Proposition 2. *Let q be an odd prime, and p a Blum prime. Then, it holds that*

$$(q \mid p) = (-p \mid q).$$

Proof. It holds that $(q \mid p) = (p \mid q)^{-1}(-1)^{\frac{p-1}{2}\frac{q-1}{2}} = (p \mid q)(-1)^{\frac{q-1}{2}} = (p \mid q)(-1 \mid q) = (-p \mid q)$, where the first equality holds by the law of quadratic reciprocity, the second holds because p is a Blum prime, the third follows from Euler's criterion and the fourth follows from the multiplicativity property of the Legendre symbol. $\square$

Let $\mathcal{R}_q = \{[r]_q : (-r \mid q) = 1\}$. Then, q is a quadratic residue modulo p if and only if

$$[p]_q \in \mathcal{R}_q. \tag{4}$$

This represents an (exclusive) disjunction of linear congruences:

$$p \equiv r_1 \,(\mathrm{mod}\ q) \ \vee \ \ldots \ \vee \ p \equiv r_\ell \,(\mathrm{mod}\ q),$$

where $\mathcal{R}_q = \{[r_1]_q, \ldots, [r_\ell]_q\}$.

Let $q_1, \ldots, q_m$ denote all odd primes that are in $[1, D]$. The condition that all integers $[1, D]$ are quadratic residues modulo x thus gives rise to the following system of *simultaneous disjunctions* of linear congruences:

$$x \equiv 7 \,(\mathrm{mod}\ 8), \ \ [x]_{q_1} \in \mathcal{R}_{q_1}, \ \ \ldots, \ \ [x]_{q_m} \in \mathcal{R}_{q_m}, \tag{5}$$

where the first congruence ensures that $(-1 \mid x) = -1$ and $(2 \mid x) = 1$.

Suppose for each $i = 1, \ldots, m$ we choose a residue class $[a_i]_{q_i} \in \mathcal{R}_{q_i}$, and we consider the resulting vector $([a_1]_{q_1}, \ldots, [a_m]_{q_m})$. We may choose the $[a_i]_{q_i}$ independently since the q_i are distinct primes. An element $([a_1]_{q_1}, \ldots, [a_m]_{q_m}) \in \mathcal{R}_{q_1} \times \cdots \times \mathcal{R}_{q_m} =: \mathcal{R}$ is in one-to-one correspondence with an arithmetic progression of step Q of solutions to the above system of congruences, that is, $x, x + Q, x + 2Q, \ldots$ where $Q = 8\prod_{i \in [m]} q_i$. Linnik's theorem [11] (combined with Xylouris' bound [20]) asserts that there will be a prime in this arithmetic progression whose size is bounded as $O(Q^5)$.

Finding the smallest such prime. Finding *some* prime that satisfies the above system is relatively easy, since we may fix a vector $([a_1]_{q_1}, \ldots, [a_m]_{q_m}) \in \mathcal{R}$. We can then enumerate all positive integers x such that $[x]_{q_i} = [a_i]_{q_i}$ via the constructive proof of the CRT, and output the first solution that is prime. However, finding the *smallest* prime that satisfies the above system is a (much) harder task, as it involves searching over the full set $\mathcal{R}$, whose cardinality is exponential in m.

In practice, we may simply enumerate all integers x in ascending order, and check whether x satisfies the system of Equation (5) rather than computing the Legendre symbols at $1, \ldots, D_0$ explicitly. We can speed up the computation by precomputing the sets $\mathcal{R}_{q_i}$ and storing them in memory. We can check many congruences at once by combining sets of congruences using the CRT. For example, for moduli q, q' we have that $[x]_q \in \mathcal{R}_q$ and $[x]_{q'} \in \mathcal{R}_{q'}$ if and only if $[x]_{qq'} \in \mathcal{R}_{qq'}$,

$$\mathcal{R}_{qq'} := (\mathcal{R}_q + \{0, q, \ldots, (\ell/q - 1)q\}) \cap (\mathcal{R}_{q'} + \{0, q', \ldots, (\ell/q' - 1)q'\}), \quad (6)$$

where $\ell = \operatorname{lcm}(q, q')$ and '+' denotes Minkowski addition. Note that we have abused notation here slightly, and represented the sets $\mathcal{R}_m$ for each modulus m as the set of integers in $[0, m-1]$ that are the canonical lifts of the residue classes mod m. By recursion, the above extends to combining more than two sets of congruences.

4.2 Finding Primes with High $d_1(p)$

For $k > 0$, for $d_k(p) \geq D$ to hold for some positive integer D, it is no longer necessary that p satisfies each disjunction of congruences in Equation (5); instead, some subsets suffice. For example, for $d_1(p) \geq 6$ we need $(2 \mid p) = 1$ and at least one of $(5 \mid p) = 1$ or $(6 \mid p) = (2 \mid p)(3 \mid p) = (3 \mid p) = 1$, otherwise Equation (2) fails to hold for $a = 5$.

In order for Equation (2) to hold, we have one set of congruences for every length-$(2k + 1)$ subinterval of $[-k, d]$; even for $k = 1$ this quickly grows prohibitively large for non-trivial lower bounds D on $d_k(p)$. While for $k > 0$ the density of primes p satisfying $d_k(p) \geq D$ is greater than for $k = 0$, the search becomes a lot more expensive.

For $k = 1$, we simplify our search for p with $d_1(p) \geq D_1$ with an extra condition: we also require $d_0(p) \geq D_0$ where $D_1 \leq (D_0)^2$. This ensures that each integer in $(D_0, D_1]$ has at most one prime factor greater or equal to D_1. Under this restriction, we get a condition equivalent to $d_1(p) \geq D_1$ which requires fewer computations to check.

Definition 4. *Let D_0, D_1 be non-negative integers with $D_0 < D_1 \leq (D_0)^2$. Let q, q' be distinct primes. We say that $\{q, q'\}$ is a* related pair *on $(D_0, D_1]$ if $D_0 < q, q' \leq D_1$ and there exist positive integers $x, y < D_0$ such that $|xq - yq'| \leq 2$ and $\max\{xq, yq'\} \leq D_1$.*

Proposition 3. *Let D_0, D_1 be non-negative integers with $D_0 < D_1 \leq (D_0)^2$, and let p be a Blum prime with $d_0(p) \geq D_0$. Then $d_1(p) \geq D_1 - 1$ if and only if the following condition holds: for every related pair of primes $\{q, q'\}$ on $(D_0, D_1]$ it holds that $(q \mid p) = 1 \lor (q' \mid p) = 1$.*

Proof. Let a be any positive integer such that $a \leq D_1$. First, we show that $(a \mid p) = -1$ if and only if a has a prime factor $q > D_0$ and $(q \mid p) = -1$. Suppose a has a prime factor $q > D_0$ with $(q \mid p) = -1$. Since $\frac{a}{q} < \frac{a}{D_0} \leq \frac{D_1}{D_0} \leq D_0$, we

have $(a/q \mid p) = 1$, hence $(a \mid p) = -1$. If a does not have a prime factor $q > D_0$ with $(q \mid p) = -1$, then taking any prime factor $q'|a$, it must hold that $q' > D_0$, in which case $(q' \mid p) = 1$ by assumption, or $q' \leq D_0$, in which case $(q' \mid p) = 1$ by $d_0(p) \geq D_0$.

We now finish the proof by showing $d_1(p) < D_1 - 1$ if and only if there is some related pair q, q' such that $(q \mid p) = (q' \mid p) = -1$. We have $d_1(p) < D_1 - 1$ if and only if there exists an integer x such that $1 < x \leq D_1 - 1$ and $(x - 1 \mid p) + (x \mid p) + (x + 1 \mid p) < 0$. This latter inequality holds if and only if at least two of $\{x - 1, x, x + 1\}$ have Legendre symbol -1. By the above, this holds if and only if two of these numbers have respective prime factors $q, q' > D_0$ and $(q \mid p) = (q' \mid p) = -1$. For these q, q', we have that they constitute a related pair, since they each have a multiple in $\{x - 1, x, x + 1\}$ and $x + 1 \leq D_1$. Conversely, for any related pair there exists such an interval $\{x - 1, x, x + 1\}$ with $1 < x \leq D_1 - 1$. $\qquad\square$

Proposition 3 gives sufficient conditions for $d_1(p) > D_1 - 1$ in terms of related pairs of primes that have to satisfy certain disjunctions of congruences. If we want to include those disjunctions in a system as shown in Equation (5), we need to represent them in the same form. For every pair of related primes $\{q, q'\}$, the condition that $(q \mid p) = 1 \vee (q' \mid p) = 1$ in Proposition 3 corresponds to taking the *union* of the associated residue sets $\mathcal{R}_q$ and $\mathcal{R}'_q$ of the related primes q and q'. That is, let $\ell = \mathrm{lcm}(q, q')$, then

$$\mathcal{R}_{q,q'} := (\mathcal{R}_q + \{0, q, \ldots, (\ell/q - 1)q\}) \cup (\mathcal{R}'_q + \{0, q', \ldots, (\ell/q' - 1)q'\}),$$

where '+' denotes Minkowski addition, and again we abuse notation and canonically lift residue classes modulo m to the integers $[0, m - 1]$. We can now express the related-primes disjunction of congruences as

$$[x]_\ell \in \mathcal{R}_{q,q'}.$$

Since this disjunction of congruences has exactly the same form as the other disjunctions in Equation (5) we can also take intersections (using Equation (6)) between a related-primes congruence $\mathcal{R}_{q,q'}$ and another disjunction of congruences.

4.3 Finding Primes with High $d_k(p)$

Definition 5. *Let D_0, D_k be non-negative integers with $D_0 < D_k \leq (D_0)^2$. Let $Q = \{q_0, \ldots, q_k\}$ be a set of $k + 1$ distinct primes. We say that Q is a* related set *on $(D_0, D_k]$ if $Q \subseteq (D_0, D_k]$ and there exist positive integers $x_0, \ldots, x_k < D_0$ such that:*

1. *for any i with $0 \leq i \leq k$ we have $x_i q_i \leq D_k$*
2. *for any i, j with $0 \leq i < j \leq k$ it holds that $|x_i q_i - x_j q_j| \leq 2k$*

Proposition 4. *Let D_0, D_k be non-negative integers with $D_0 < D_k \leq (D_0)^2$, and let p be a Blum prime with $d_0(p) \geq D_0$. Then $d_k(p) \geq D_k - k$ if and only if the following condition holds: for every set Q of $k + 1$ distinct primes related on $(D_0, D_k]$, it holds that there exists some $q \in Q$ with $(q \mid p) = 1$.*

Fig. 2: Graphical comparison of the comparison range achieved by Yu's method (d_0 and d_0^*) vs. our method. The data for d_0 is taken from [12, Table 6.23] (and d_0^* follows from applying the relation discussed in Section 3.4, i.e., $d_0^* = d_0/2 - 1$).

The proof goes along the same lines as that of Proposition 3.

Remark 1. Although we have presented Proposition 4 for general k, in practice we shall mostly use $k \in \{1, 2\}$. For larger k, the restriction $D_0 < D_k \leq (D_0)^2$ causes the conditions for $d_0(p) \geq D_0$ to dominate the search.

In Table 1 we show a list of primes for which $d_k(p)$ is strictly increasing, for $k \in \{1, 2\}$. See also Figure 2, where we graphically compare our method to Yu's work in terms of the achieved comparison range.

4.4 Finding Primes with High $d_k^*(p)$

We can also apply the method from Section 4.3 to find p with large $d_k^*(p)$, but the search procedure needs to be modified slightly. We present the appropriate modifications to the conditions.

Definition 6. *Let D_0, D_k be non-negative integers with $D_0 < D_k \leq (D_0)^2$. Let $Q = \{q_0, \ldots, q_k\}$ be a set of $k+1$ distinct primes. We say that Q is a $*$-related set on $(D_0, D_k]$ if $Q \subseteq (D_0, D_k]$ and there exist positive odd integers $x_0, \ldots, x_k < D_0$ such that:*

1. *for any i with $0 \leq i \leq k$ we have $x_i q_i \leq D_k$*
2. *for any i, j with $0 \leq i < j \leq k$ it holds that $|x_i q_i - x_j q_j| \in \{2, 4, 6, \ldots, 4k\}$*

Proposition 5. *Let D_0, D_k be non-negative integers with $D_0 < D_k \leq (D_0)^2$, and let p be a Blum prime with $d_0^*(p) \geq \frac{1}{2}D_0$. Then $d_k^*(p) \geq \frac{1}{2}D_k - k$ if and only if the following condition holds: for every set Q of $k+1$ distinct primes $*$-related on $(D_0, D_k]$, it holds that there exists some $q \in Q$ with $(q \mid p) = 1$.*

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Table 1: Sequence of primes in increasing order (and their bit lengths ℓ) for which $d_k(p)$ is strictly increasing, for $k \in \{1, 2\}$. The primes below the dashed lines (for $\ell \geq 37$) have been found via our simplified search method, which means that there could exist smaller primes that give rise to the same or higher values of $d_1(p)$ resp. $d_2(p)$. The primes below "$\star\star\star$" are the 64 bit primes with the highest k-range that we found.

ℓ	p	$d_1(p)$
5	23	5
5	31	10
7	71	11
8	167	13
8	191	19
10	599	20
11	1319	37
12	3119	40
14	9719	45
14	14951	60
17	110039	65
18	211559	66
19	283631	67
19	289511	72
19	333791	109
21	1884791	129
22	2817239	140
24	10522511	149
25	25155191	156
25	29036999	157
27	79107311	179
27	89658791	217
30	927633671	227
31	1514970551	276
36	56709623759	277
36	60221191631	281
- - -	- - - - - - - -	- - -
37	81720228911	291
37	86345286719	339
38	187800947879	396
43	8714428081631	431
44	10422103551551	437
44	13729797542471	443
47	78991232073599	452
47	100395799811999	461
54	12210981354571991	577
54	13162388389217591	639
57	93521022740468231	641
57	141840650661890879	683
60	692038256994017639	685
61	1507647405383450231	756
63	5831572531519229351	809
	$\star\star\star$	
64	123671309755574671999	732

ℓ	p	$d_2(p)$
5	23	8
5	31	10
7	71	11
8	167	14
8	191	19
8	239	20
9	359	26
9	479	35
11	1151	38
11	1511	41
12	3527	43
12	3911	58
13	6551	59
14	8951	66
14	12239	89
15	25679	140
19	289511	176
20	662639	182
22	2798351	212
24	10328111	223
24	16178399	226
25	17431391	250
25	19632791	255
25	25380911	276
25	30809159	280
26	53422151	290
27	92989511	308
28	246241511	318
29	442696271	329
30	721250351	379
30	984093431	458
35	18233703479	498
35	29919732911	502
- - -	- - - - - - - -	- - -
37	95110047119	508
38	149120083199	562
38	241922449271	570
40	696567525359	588
40	700217963639	608
41	1291095727151	640
41	2088877265999	668
43	8590297237079	720
44	10268163904319	724
45	18623040462311	743
45	21505791039431	785
46	49223854293071	878
48	1542272279972359	884
52	3392073984672071	931
55	21749977880115911	938
56	38746340388406031	1046
56	47155355205792599	1265
60	9849262559333291591	1283
63	7143849267677035679	1336
	$\star\star\star$	
64	13030782144247916831	1316

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Table 2: Sequence of primes in increasing order (and their bit lengths ℓ) for which $d_k^*(p)$ is strictly increasing, for $k \in \{1, 2\}$. Primes below the dashed lines have been found via our simplified search method, which means that there could exist smaller primes that give rise to the same or higher values of $d_1^*(p)$ resp. $d_2^*(p)$. For the primes above the dashed lines, it holds that the prime is the smallest possible for a given $d_k^*(p)$. The prime below "$\star\star\star$" is the 64 bit prime with the highest value of $d_2^*(p)$ that we found.

ℓ	p	$d_1^*(p)$
5	23	1
6	47	4
7	83	5
8	131	7
8	239	8
8	251	14
10	1019	16
11	1091	24
13	4259	30
14	10331	33
14	12011	34
17	74051	42
17	96851	44
19	420731	47
20	831899	52
20	878099	53
20	954971	68
23	5317259	78
25	19127891	79
25	31585979	94
28	140258219	98
30	697955579	104
31	1452130811	112
31	1919592419	115
33	4323344819	116
33	4499001491	117
33	6024587819	118
34	9259782419	138
35	19846138451	143
36	34613840351	151
37	73773096179	153
- - -	- - - - - - - - -	- - -
37	119607747731	174
38	163030664579	182
38	170361409391	207
43	4754588149211	229
48	171772053182831	242
48	178774759690511	243
48	205152197251811	258
52	2950193919326891	259
52	3705750905778011	284
54	10624213337944379	296
55	26259748609914431	321
57	141840650661890879	340
59	321961111376298371	345
61	1158960903343074191	348
61	1561357308831673339	378
64	9409569905028393239	383

ℓ	p	$d_2^*(p)$
6	47	3
7	83	6
8	131	8
8	179	15
10	1019	16
11	1091	26
11	1427	31
11	1811	36
14	9539	51
15	19211	68
19	334619	78
20	717419	80
21	1204139	104
22	2808251	114
24	8774531	116
24	11532611	117
25	18225611	152
27	98962211	155
28	247330859	166
30	738165419	174
30	1030152059	188
31	1456289579	197
32	2451099251	206
34	11159531291	207
34	13730529419	216
35	17221585499	219
35	19186524419	232
35	26203369331	242
37	92830394411	248
37	128808841619	287
38	232481520059	324
39	408727560491	335
40	807183995411	370
- - -	- - - - - - - - -	- - -
44	15869813229371	373
45	19379613618119	411
46	46760546950211	412
48	240160967391791	425
49	294269750529611	456
53	8755197891979139	526
57	85283169141238571	528
58	148892345027857499	599
61	1915368196138563011	648
	$\star\star\star$	
64	10807930853257193939	623

4.5 Implementation and Results

We have implemented a search algorithm for primes p with minimal $d_k(p)$ and $d_k^*(p)$ for $k = 0, 1, 2$ using the precomputation of linear congruences as detailed above. We have enumerated all minimal p up to 64 bits with ascending $d_1(p)$ and with $d_0(p) \geq 64$, and likewise for ascending $d_1^*(p)$ with $d_0^*(p) \geq 32$. Our implementation is written in Rust and uses the wheel method from [16]. It is publicly available on GitHub [1].

Table 2 shows results of our search for primes that give rise to as high as possible values of $d_1^*(p)$ and $d_2^*(p)$.

Open Problem. We leave open the problem of proving asymptotic lower bounds (in the Hardy–Littlewood's Big-Omega sense) as well as (better) upper bounds on $d_k(p)$ and $d_k^*(p)$ for $k \geq 1$.

5 Secure Protocols for bsgn

In this section we present several protocols for evaluating the bsgn function, assuming that p is a Blum prime. Note that these protocols immediately imply comparison protocols; from the triangle inequality it follows that correctness for comparison is guaranteed if both inputs lie in $[-\lfloor d/2 \rfloor, \lfloor d/2 \rfloor]$, where $[-d, d]$ is the input range of the bsgn protocol.

We first present protocol Legendre, shown as Protocol 1, for securely evaluating the Legendre symbol. The protocol is stated in terms of black-box invocations of protocols RandomBit() for securely sampling a random bit $\{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ and RandomElem$((\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*))$ for securely sampling a random element from $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$.

Protocol 1 Legendre($[\![x]\!]$)

Offline Phase
  $[\![s]\!] \leftarrow 2 \cdot \mathsf{RandomBit}() - 1$
  $[\![u]\!] \leftarrow \mathsf{RandomElem}((\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*)$
  $[\![r]\!] \leftarrow [\![s]\!] \cdot [\![u]\!]^2$
Online Phase
  $c \leftarrow [\![x]\!] \cdot [\![r]\!]$
  return $(c \mid p) \cdot [\![s]\!]$

5.1 Secure Medium-Range bsgn Protocol for $k = 1$

In our protocol for $k = 1$, shown as Protocol 2, we compute the binary sign of the sum of the Legendre symbols by means of the multivariate polynomial

$$f(x, y, z) = \frac{x + y + z - xyz}{2}.$$

It is easy to verify that f correctly computes the sign of the sum of $x, y, z \in \{-1, +1\}$. The two secure multiplications required for the evaluation of $f(x, y, z)$

can be combined with the secure evaluations of the Legendre symbols such that the round complexity is not increased, as shown next.

Protocol 2 bsgn1Simple($[\![a]\!]$), $|a| \le d_1^*(p)$

$[\![x]\!] \leftarrow$ Legendre($2[\![a]\!] - 1$)
$[\![y]\!] \leftarrow$ Legendre($2[\![a]\!] + 1$)
$[\![z]\!] \leftarrow$ Legendre($2[\![a]\!] + 3$)
return $([\![x]\!] + [\![y]\!] + [\![z]\!] - [\![x]\!][\![y]\!][\![z]\!])/2$

Decreasing the round complexity in the online phase. Protocol bsgn1Simple requires three rounds in the online phase. We can bring this down to a single round by precomputing the product of the random Legendre symbols produced in the offline phase of the Legendre protocol. This is shown in Protocol 3. The random bit protocol has been concretely instantiated in the offline phase of Protocol 3 to show that the product of the three random Legendre symbols can be computed in parallel to the preparation of their corresponding random elements. The offline phase requires two rounds in addition to the round complexity of securely sampling random elements of $(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$.

Protocol 3 bsgn1SingleRound($[\![a]\!]$), $|a| \le d_1^*(p)$

Offline Phase
  for $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ **do** $[\![t_i]\!], [\![u_i]\!] \leftarrow$ RandomElem($(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$), RandomElem($(\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z})^*$)
  $[\![u]\!] \leftarrow [\![u_1]\!] \cdot [\![u_2]\!]$
  for $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ **do** $[\![v_i]\!], w_i \leftarrow [\![t_i]\!] \cdot [\![t_i]\!], \ [\![u_i]\!] \cdot [\![u_i]\!]$
  $[\![s]\!] \leftarrow [\![u]\!] \cdot [\![u_3]\!] \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{3} w_i^{-1/2}$
  for $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ **do** $[\![r_i]\!], [\![s_i]\!] \leftarrow [\![v_i]\!] \cdot [\![u_i]\!] \cdot w_i^{-1/2}, \ [\![u_i]\!] \cdot w_i^{-1/2}$
Online Phase
  for $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ **do** $c_i \leftarrow (2[\![a]\!] - 3 + 2i) \cdot [\![r_i]\!]$
  return $\left(\sum_{i=1}^{3} [\![s_i]\!] \cdot (c_i \mid p) - [\![s]\!] \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{3} (c_i \mid p) \right) / 2$

5.2 Secure Medium-Range bsgn Protocol for $k = 2$

In our protocol for $k = 2$, shown as Protocol 4, we compute the binary sign of the sum of the five Legendre symbols by means of another invocation of Legendre. In the latter (outer) invocation of Legendre, we need not apply the $x \mapsto 2x + 1$ map because we sum an odd number of values in $\{-1, +1\}$ which cannot become zero. Note that this requires that $d_0(p) \ge 5$ for correctness of the protocol.

   Similar to the $k = 1$ case, we may replace the evaluation of the Legendre symbol at the end by the evaluation of a suitable polynomial. For instance, one can use the univariate polynomial $f(x) = (3x^5 - 110x^3 + 1067x)/960$, which maps $x \in \{1, 3, 5\}$ to 1 and $x \in \{-1, -3, -5\}$ to -1. This polynomial can be evaluated in three rounds using ordinary secure multiplication. Alternatively, a 5-variate

polynomial can be used, in which case the required secure multiplications can be combined again with the secure evaluations of the Legendre symbols such that the round complexity of the online phase is not increased (as in the $k = 1$ case).

Protocol 4 $\mathsf{bsgn2}(\llbracket a \rrbracket)$, $\qquad |a| \le d_2^*(p), \quad d_0(p) \ge 5$

$\llbracket x_1 \rrbracket \leftarrow \mathsf{Legendre}(2\llbracket a \rrbracket - 3)$
$\llbracket x_2 \rrbracket \leftarrow \mathsf{Legendre}(2\llbracket a \rrbracket - 1)$
$\llbracket x_3 \rrbracket \leftarrow \mathsf{Legendre}(2\llbracket a \rrbracket + 1)$
$\llbracket x_4 \rrbracket \leftarrow \mathsf{Legendre}(2\llbracket a \rrbracket + 3)$
$\llbracket x_5 \rrbracket \leftarrow \mathsf{Legendre}(2\llbracket a \rrbracket + 5)$
return $\mathsf{Legendre}(\llbracket x_1 \rrbracket + \llbracket x_2 \rrbracket + \llbracket x_3 \rrbracket + \llbracket x_4 \rrbracket + \llbracket x_5 \rrbracket)$

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6 Application: Fast Neural Network Evaluation in MPC

In this section we demonstrate the usefulness of our secure binary-sign evaluation technique for securely evaluating a neural network.

6.1 Binarized Multi-Layer Perceptron for MNIST

For our experiments, we take the binarized multi-layer perceptron of Courbariaux et al. for recognizing handwritten digits from the well-known MNIST benchmark data set [7], which we refer as BMLP below. The BMLP network uses the sign function as its non-linear activation function, and is designed to be evaluated using integer arithmetic only. This allows for a natural MPC implementation.

The MNIST data set contains images of 28-by-28 pixels, where the intensity of each pixel is represented by a byte, i.e., an integer in $\mathcal{B} := [0, 255]$ (0 represents black, 255 represents white, and the values in between represent shades of gray). For the BMLP network, an input image is represented as a byte *vector* $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{B}^{784}$. Note that by reshaping a two-dimensional image into a (one-dimensional) vector the spatial structure is lost, but this is not a problem for multi-layer perceptrons (as opposed to convolutional neural networks, for instance).

Let n denote the number of neurons per layer. The BMLP network consists of four layers, and uses $n = 4096$. We view each layer L_i, $i \in [1, 4]$, as a map between an input and output vector:

$$\begin{aligned}
L_1 : &\quad \mathcal{B}^{784} \to \{-1, +1\}^n, \\
L_i : &\quad \{-1, +1\}^n \to \{-1, +1\}^n, \qquad i \in \{2, 3\} \\
L_4 : &\quad \{-1, +1\}^n \to \mathbb{Z}^{10}.
\end{aligned}$$

Let $k_1 = k_2 = k_3 = m_2 = m_3 = m_4 = n$ and $k_4 = 10$ and $m_1 = 784$. In [7], the output of L_i is computed as

$$L_i(\boldsymbol{x}) := \begin{cases} \mathrm{BinarySign}(\mathrm{BatchNorm}_{\Theta_i}^{k_i}(W_i \boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b}_i)), & i \in \{1, 2, 3\} \\ \mathrm{BatchNorm}_{\Theta_i}^{k_i}(W_i \boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b}_i) & i = 4. \end{cases}$$

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Here $W_i \in \{-1, +1\}^{k_i \times m_i}$ is a matrix of weights, and $\boldsymbol{b}_i \in \mathbb{Z}^{k_i}$ is a vector of bias values. The function BatchNorm, which applies *batch normalization* element-wise, is defined as

$$\text{BatchNorm}_{\Theta_i}^{\ell} : \quad \begin{aligned} \mathbb{Z}^{\ell} &\to \mathbb{Z}^{\ell} \\ (x_1, \ldots, x_\ell) &\mapsto (f_{\Theta_i,1}(x_1), \ldots, f_{\Theta_i,\ell}(x_\ell)) \end{aligned}$$

where $\Theta_i := (\boldsymbol{\mu}_i, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_i, \boldsymbol{\gamma}_i, \boldsymbol{\beta}_i)$ are the batch norm parameters for the ith layer: $\boldsymbol{\mu}_i = (\mu_{i,1}, \ldots, \mu_{i,\ell})$, $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_i = (\tilde{\sigma}_{i,j})_{j \in [1,\ell]}$, $\boldsymbol{\gamma} = (\gamma_{i,j})_{j \in [1,\ell]}$, and $\boldsymbol{\beta} = (\beta_{i,j})_{j \in [1,\ell]}$, and

$$f_{\Theta_i,j}(x) := \gamma_{i,j}\left(\frac{x - \mu_{i,j}}{\tilde{\sigma}_{i,j}}\right) + \beta_{i,j}.$$

The function BinarySign applies the bsgn function element-wise,

$$\text{BinarySign} : \quad \begin{aligned} \mathbb{Z}^n &\to \{-1, +1\}^n \\ (x_1, \ldots, x_n) &\mapsto (\text{bsgn}(x_1), \ldots, \text{bsgn}(x_n)). \end{aligned}$$

To obtain the final output of the BMLP, which is an integer $y \in [0, 9]$, we apply an (oblivious) argmax operation to the output of L_4:

$$y := \arg\max L_4(L_3(L_2(L_1(\boldsymbol{x})))).$$

Training the Network. We have trained the BMLP on a GPU using Courbariaux' original implementation (described in [7]) which is publicly available on GitHub.

6.2 Eliminating Redundant Parts of Batch Normalization

In layers 1–3, the BinarySign function is applied directly to the output of the BatchNorm function. Because the bsgn function is invariant to multiplying its input by a positive scalar, the BatchNorm function might perform some operations that are immediately undone by the bsgn function. Indeed, it actually turns out that the BatchNorm function (when followed by the BinarySign function) reduces to an additional bias term; the authors of [7] seem to have overlooked this. Formally,

$$f_i(x) = \gamma_i\left(\frac{x - \mu_i}{\tilde{\sigma}_i}\right) + \beta_i = \frac{\gamma_i}{\tilde{\sigma}_i}\left(x - \mu_i + \frac{\beta_i \tilde{\sigma}_i}{\gamma_i}\right),$$

$$\text{bsgn}(f_i(x)) = \text{bsgn}\left(x - \mu_i + \frac{\beta_i \tilde{\sigma}_i}{\gamma_i}\right), \qquad \gamma_i, \tilde{\sigma}_i > 0.$$

Hence, we update the bias vector in all layers except the last as follows,

$$\boldsymbol{b}_i' := \boldsymbol{b}_i - \boldsymbol{\mu}_i + \frac{\boldsymbol{\beta}_i \tilde{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_i}{\boldsymbol{\gamma}_i}$$

where all operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division) in the above expression are performed element-wise. With this modification, evaluation of the BMLP network simplifies to

$$L_i(\boldsymbol{x}) = \begin{cases} \text{BinarySign}(W_i \boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b}_i'), & i \in \{1, 2, 3\} \\ \text{BatchNorm}_{\Theta_i}^{k_i}(W_i \boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b}_i) & i = 4. \end{cases}$$

6.3 Instantiating the BinarySign Function Per Layer

Our aim is to instantiate the BinarySign function using our medium-range bsgn protocols. Nonetheless, for layer L_1, the magnitudes of the elements in the vector $W_1\boldsymbol{x} + \boldsymbol{b}_1'$ for some image $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{B}^{784}$ will typically be way too large compared to the input range on which our bsgn protocols guarantee a correct answer. Hence, for L_1 we instantiate BinarySign as the element-wise application of an "off-the-shelf" large-range bsgn protocol, such as Toft's comparison protocol [18].

For layers L_2 and L_3 we instantiate BinarySign with (element-wise applications of) Protocol bsgn1Simple using a 64-bit prime modulus p for which $d_1^*(p) = 383$, and, in separate experiments, with bsgn2 using a 64-bit modulus p' for which $d_2^*(p') = 594$, and with Yu's method, using a 62-bit modulus p'' for which $d_0^*(p'') = 134$.[6] Also for these layers, there seems to be a mismatch between the input ranges of bsgn1Simple, bsgn2 and Yu's method on which they guarantee correctness, i.e., $[-383, 383]$, $[-594, 594]$ and $[-134, 134]$ respectively, and the magnitudes of the elements in the vector $W_i\boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{b}_i'$ for $i \in \{2, 3\}$, where $\boldsymbol{y} \in \{-1, +1\}^n$. The first term in this sum (the vector $W_i\boldsymbol{y}$), can have elements with magnitude equal to n in the worst case, where $n = 4096$. Nonetheless, the distribution of values in the vector $W_i\boldsymbol{y} + \boldsymbol{b}_i'$ for all $i \in \{2, 3\}$ is strongly concentrated around zero, hence we will just ignore the fact that our bsgn-protocols will be invoked a number of times on values outside the range for which they guarantee correctness. As we show quantitatively in Table 3, for our protocols this does not deteriorate the classification performance compared to a network where the full-range sign protocol is also used in layers L_2 and L_3, while for Yu's method (with prime p'') the error rate increases by 38%. (Surprisingly, using bsgn1Simple even slightly improves the performance on the MNIST test set.)

6.4 Experimental Results (Neural Network Evaluation)

We have implemented the neural network in MPyC, a Python framework for secure multiparty computation [15]. The case $k = 0$ comes down to applying the map $x \mapsto 2x + 1$ to the input followed by invoking Protocol 1, for $k = 1$ we used a mixture of Protocol 2 and Protocol 3, and for $k = 2$ we used Protocol 4, in all cases expanding the calls to Protocol 1 to parallelize the secure computations of the Legendre symbol as much as possible. As a baseline we use the MPyC built-in secure comparison protocol, which is based on Toft's protocol [18]. For a meaningful performance evaluation, we set the bit length to 10 bits for the built-in comparisons used in layers 2 and 3. We have also vectorized the code for all these comparison protocols, handling $n = 4096$ comparisons at the same time for layers 1–3, which increases the speed considerably.

We have run our experiments on a 3PC-LAN setup (CPUs: Intel four-core 4th generation Core i7 3.6 GHz). A complete evaluation between three parties on a secret-shared input image, using secret-shared weights and bias vectors,

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[6] The prime moduli are $p = 9409569905028393239$, $p' = 15569949805843283171$ and $p'' = 3546374752298322551$.

Table 3: Classification performance of the BMLP on 10,000 MNIST test images

	Full-Range Sign	Yu ($k = 0$)	bsgn1Simple	bsgn2
Number of misclassifications	248	342	227	247
Error rate	0.0248	0.0342	0.0227	0.0247

runs in 59 seconds for $k = 0$, 60 seconds for $k = 1$, in 62 seconds for $k = 2$, and in 67 seconds for full-range comparisons. For evaluation of a batch of 10 input images the times are 205, 223, 235, and 302 seconds, respectively. The times for processing all comparisons in layers 2 and 3 are 6, 20, 34, and 99 seconds, respectively. Hence, in this experiment the Legendre-based comparisons with $k = 1$ are about 5 times faster than full-range comparisons. Similar speedups may be expected with other MPC frameworks for applications with comparisons restricted to medium-sized integers.

To determine the error rate for our particular BMLP, we have also implemented it in Python (including the Python counterparts of Yu's method and the Protocols bsgn1Simple and bsgn2, producing exactly the same errors outside their input ranges). The results measured for the 10,000 MNIST test images are shown in Table 3.

Acknowledgments

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